# Demand side governance in the Africa region – Moving forward

Paper for AFTCS, Africa Region, World Bank

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This paper starts with two assumptions:

- With a few exceptions elections and political parties have not been successful across Africa over the past five decades in holding the state accountable to its citizens.

- Increasing a state's accountability to its citizens will lead to better delivery of public goods and services, which in turn will lead to human development and poverty reduction.

The paper's principal objective will then be to ask what is the scope for non-state actors to make the state more accountable to its citizens and what international donors might do to assist efforts to enhance that accountability. In particular, it will focus on civil society as offering a path to attaining state accountability.[1]

## Background

In recent years the World Bank has become very much concerned with the issue of state accountability to citizens, and in fact its *World Development Report* for 2004 (or WDR2004) was devoted to this theme. WDR2004 was crafted around a model of elegant simplicity: The "long and short routes to accountability for public service delivery," which is depicted in Figure 1.[2]

In the countries now counted among the world's more advanced democracies, most public services are provided through the "long route," in which citizens exercise "voice" by electing political leaders, who make policy decisions that are transmitted through a "compact" with a service provider organization (traditionally a bureaucracy, but it could be a private operator working though a contract with the state) which then delivers the services through "frontline providers" who work in a government agency's place of business (a school, health dispensary, fire house, licensing center, etc.). The citizenry is in effect the "principal", while the elected political leaders become its "agents" and the providers are sub-agents directed by the agents.

The basic mechanism for voice, of course, is contested elections with political parties participating, and following Schumpeter (1942) many analysts have regarded such contestation as the *sine qua non* of democracy.[3] As its name implies, the long route tends not to be a quick one, dependent as it is upon agents and subagents to carry out the wishes of the citizen principals.

An alternative is the "short route," which is modeled on a market economy. Here citizens exercise "client power" vis-à-vis public service providers, for instance using educational vouchers to choose schools for their children or ration coupons to purchase subsidized food commodities from the vendor they prefer.[4] When it works, it is faster and more transparent than the long route, but it also presents problems, as will be explained below.

In this paper, after discussing the long and short routes along with their drawbacks, I will suggest civil society as a third route to accountability, lying in between the long and short paths. I then look briefly at Community Driven Development as an approach to accountability, followed by an overview of quantitative studies endeavoring to measure actual evidence of achieving it. In the remainder of the paper, I will examine how the Africa region ap-

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[1] Key terms used in the paper, such as "accountability" and "civil society," are defined in Box 1.

[2] I have included a replication of this well-known figure here, because I will be referring to it often in this paper and will want to modify it a bit further on.

[3] Today it is more common in international development circles to see elections as representing a basic "entry level" status in democratization, a way station on the road toward "liberal democracy," which includes the full range of political rights and civil liberties. For a concise account of these differences, see Diamond (2008: 20-23 &ff).

[4] For an excellent overview of the two routes, with examples from all regions, see Devarajan and Shah (2004).

pears to different from other areas in both qualitative and quantitative measures, and finally draw some implications for donors.

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**Box 1.  Definitions**

Many of the terms used in this paper have proven contentious in varying ways over the couple of decades they have been in use within the international development community.  Accordingly, it would be good to pin down just what I will mean by them.

**Accountability** will indicate the extent to which the state must respond to citizen voice; it thus covers a range of state reactions from ignoring to complying.  This is often called "vertical accountability," to distinguish it from "horizontal accountability" in which state institutions are subject to some degree of checking from each other (executive to the judiciary, for example).  In this paper, I will be dealing more or less exclusively with the vertical sort of accountability, so the adjective will not be used.

**Civil society** will refer to the arena or social space that is separate from the state, the market and the family, in which citizens come together to promote their common interests.  The groups they form may be formal or informal, but must be voluntary and essentially non-profit.

Though many attempts have been made to separate the terms **civil society organizations (CSOs)** and **non-government organizations (NGOs)**, there is sufficient confusion about the terms that they will be used here (as so often elsewhere) interchangeably.

**Governance** will mean the whole range of state sector activity at all levels, including the relationships between state and non-state actors.  But this paper will concentrate primarily on the local level.

**Voice** will refer to citizen expressions of preferences and views directed toward the state.  It can be expressed through a variety of mechanisms such as elections, civil society advocacy, legal action, media, citizen report cards, open municipal meetings, and participatory budgeting

**Voice and accountability (V&A)** refers to the World Bank measure employed in its *Governance Matters* series of reports. V&A employs a variety of measures to capture "perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media" (Kaufmann et al. 2009: 6).

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## Problems with the long route

The long route can work, and historically it has worked to improve service delivery to marginal constituencies in the advanced countries, albeit slowly over time.  And there is good evidence that in various forms it can work in developing countries today.  WDR2004 points to politicians expanding services to their supporters, citing the Labour Party's successful 2001 campaign in the United Kingdom (World Bank 2003: 79), and one can trace the earlier birth and expansion of such initiatives as universal primary and later on secondary education, women's suffrage, legal protection for labor unions, and the National Health Service along similar lines.  In the United States, Social Security, civil rights, Medicare and Affirmative Action exhibited distinct parallels to the British experience.  All these endeavors were launched and supported in significant part to reach out to, mobilize and nurture marginal constituencies.

Among developing nations, India provides many similar examples, like Scheduled Caste reservations dating from the early 1950s, Other Backward Caste preferences dating from the 1980s, and quotas for women in elected representative bodies beginning in the 1990s. In the 2009 Indian parliamentary election, government performance in de-

livering services to non-elite strata and campaign promises to deliver more played a major role.[5] But all these efforts took decades and longer to bring about. In India, the drive for universal primary education began in the 1930s – even before independence – and despite advances remains unfulfilled.[6] As with the British and American examples, it is certainly possible to interpret these developments as opportunistic maneuvers by hypocritical politicians trying to build new vote banks with patronage,[7] and such readings would not be completely off the mark, but these expansions in opportunity and public service delivery were in fact generated equally if not more so by moral demands for equity. Self-interest and the moral high ground can indeed move together.

The lengthy timeframe required for these long route reforms gives more than a little pause to donor community agencies that wish to move improvement in service delivery rather faster, however. The mandate imposed by the Millennium Development Goals, along with pressure from sponsoring governments for the bilaterals and boards of governors for the multilaterals, calls for much more rapid progress.

Evidence does exist showing efficacy for the long route in shorter time periods, to be sure. The new Bolivian government elected in 1993 undertook a series of major reforms for service providers in the water, electricity and telephone sectors. Water was privatized, electricity continued to be private, and private telephone providers were invited to compete with cooperatives. For all three sectors, the state regulatory agency required strict contracts increasing accountability to the state. A study undertaken at the end of the decade found that within the lowest income quintile in Bolivia's twin cities of La Paz and El Alto water coverage increased by 20% and electricity by 10%. Cell phone usage increased by a factor of ten, while rates dropped significantly. (Foster and Irusta 2003). What happened here, was that the long route (the election of 1993) established the political will at the top to move into action a regulatory body forceful enough to impose a short route regime for telephones (customers could choose between providers) and turn the private sector into a responsible and responsive supplier in the water and power areas. For water and power, the private sector in effect became a well-controlled proxy as frontline provider, to employ the WDR2004 vocabulary of Figure 1.

The critical factor in this successful long route example was the political will that came into office through the 1993 election. Political will can coalesce sufficiently to produce reforms without real elections, as happened in Uganda with the anti-corruption drive launched by the Ministry of Education in the late 1990s, as reported by Reinikka and Svensson (2007). Alarmed that so little of state nonwage allocations to primary education actually reached the primary schools themselves, the Ministry began releasing monthly transfer data by district level to the press and urging local newspapers to publish the information. With such data in hand, local political notables, school officials, village elders and tribal leaders could compare the shortfall in what their schools received, and they protested loudly enough that the average share of central grants actually received at local level increased from less than a quarter to over four-fifths between 1995 and 2001. Some two-thirds of what had been siphoned off on the way from the center to the district now flowed downward as it should. In this case, the long route was in effect jump-started at the policymaker level to stiffen up the compact between the state and the providers, who then had the resources available to deliver educational services to the citizenry. As with the Bolivian example, a number of things had to fall into place for the long route to succeed, but the most important one was the political will to initiate and superintend the process.

An often more feasible way the long route can function to deliver needed services is simply to increase state expenditure with all else including inefficiencies held constant, which amounts to accountability attained through simply expanding the state budget enough to meet demand. Thus the expansion of education stemming from Latin American democratization in the twentieth century's last decades (as political leaders sought to bolster their support bases)

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[5]  See Kumar (2009), Suri (2009) and other articles in the special issue of the *Economic and Political Weekly*, 26 September 2009. For a deeper and more longitudinal analysis of these party-voter linkages in India, see Wilkinson (2007) and for a more general assay of the phenomenon in developing areas, see the essays in Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007).

[6]  See Weiner (1990) for a comprehensive account of universal primary education in India. Two decades later, education provision had improved considerably (cf. the UNDP *Human Development Reports*), but clearly a great deal remains to be done.

[7]  The dividing lines between constituency service, clientelism, neopatrimonialism, patronage, etc., are vague at best. In general, it could be said that if real contested elections are present, there is some degree of accountability, absent such mechanisms, the more the relationship between officeholder and citizen becomes one of clientelism in which the latter is at the mercy of the former. For a fuller account in an African context, see van de Walle (2007) and Bratton and van de Walle (1997: esp. 61-96).

did lead to more schools serving more students.  But this approach only works so long as state budgets can expand.  The downturn in public spending more recently, however, has meant that inefficient long route methods can no longer improve the educational services on offer (Fiszbein 2005).  In most African countries with their straitened financial circumstances, this option has been on the table much more briefly if at all.  There are, of course, a number of resource-rich states like Equatorial Guinea, which could go on more or less indefinitely increasing public service delivery, but most if not all of them, corruption has become so rampant that such a course seems clearly impossible.

Beyond the difficulties in finding political will or expandable budgets, there are also a good number of other problems attendant upon the long route:

- It requires real electoral contestation, such that political leaders and parties have an existential incentive to deliver public services to the citizenry.

- It needs (at least somewhat) informed voters who can give broad policy direction at election time.  And even well-informed votes can give only blunt instructions through elections to their leaders (e.g., revive the economy, stop a war).

- It stands at risk in deeply divided polities (prey to identity politics and/or demagoguery).

- Clientelist politics is very hard to stop, since it provides so many short-term benefits to elites and is so immediately gratifying to supporters, while doing very little to promote actual economic growth and human development.

- If services are to be provided through the public sector, serious civil service reform invariably must be undertaken, but, given the encrustations of patronage, entitlement and corruption that have accumulated over time, this has become virtually impossible in many developing countries.

- The chain from citizen to service provision is so complex in terms of actors and so long in terms of time that incentives and sanctions may well disappear before the point of actually delivering services is reached.

- Providers can capture policymakers, e.g., through unions or patronage linkages, especially when they have become patrons themselves.

For all these reasons, the short route whereby citizens engage directly with service providers has taken on great appeal in the donor community, especially after its articulation in the World Bank's *World Development Report 2004*, which as its subtitle indicates focused on *Making Services Work for Poor People*.

## The appeal of the short route

The short route can take two forms: clients can be given a choice of providers (as with school vouchers); or they can assume a more direct relationship to a single provider, exercising some degree of actual involvement in state decision making (as in Brazilian participatory budgeting).  What both short routes have in common is that service providers must be accountable to their clients, either because clients can abandon the provider in favor of a competitor, or because they exercise influence on how the state operates, possibly including the ability to exercise some discipline over the provider. Either arrangement requires support from the relevant political leadership or at the least its acquiescence.

Both short routes have strong attractions in comparison with the long route.  The choice-of-provider route approximates a market system, in which consumers (clients or citizens in our accountability model) choose among products and vendors (frontline providers in the WDR2004 model) to find the goods or services best for them.  And it allows clients/citizens to maximize their utility (satisfaction in the model) by using their ability to switch from one service provider to another.

The direct involvement approach puts community representatives in a decision-making role, generally in the form of allocating public investments in local goods and services.  Rather than elected officials or (usually distant) bureaucratic managers determining how public funds will be spent, community groups take on some role in this task, exercising their preferences. There is a wide range of possibilities here, as illustrated in Figure 2, between what amounts to citizen petitions on one end to actually allocating public investments on the other.

Both routes are "short" not only in terms of distance in WDR2004's diagrams, but in terms of transaction costs and often time.  Citizens/clients deal directly with providers, and do not have to wade through layers of paperwork to make the bureaucratic wheels turn or wait for them to grind.  With the choice-of-provider form, action can immediately follow decision, as with American food stamps, which can be exchanged for food at any grocery store.  With the direct involvement type of short route, things take longer, as citizens or their representatives indicate preferences directly to the state with varying degrees of authority.

Like the long route, the short one also can present problems, some of them not surprisingly similar to those encountered so often with market economy systems:

- The provider incentive can be to deliver services to those with effective demand (e.g., who have the vouchers, live in the right geographical areas, belong to the right community, have the right political connections), not necessarily to all comers.  Thus minorities or indigenes may find access to schools, dispensaries, or water supply difficult or impossible, even though they are legally entitled to such services.

- Just as single providers can collect monopoly rents or a small number can create an oligopoly in the market, a limited number of providers can do the same with public services.

- Absent political will at the top and observance of Weberian norms in the bureaucracy, frontline providers may not follow through with behavioral changes desired by those consuming public services.  Despite citizen report cards, school teachers still may not attend classes, medicines may not show up at dispensaries, etc.

- Consumers often lack essential information regarding product, so cannot make good choices.

- As the examples given in this section confirm, the short route is essentially a local one.  In the United States, the partial privatization of Medicare in recent years gives senior citizens some choice of state level medical insurers, but in developing countries it has worked at the local level.  Indeed, it is difficult to imagine citizens involving themselves directly in delivering specific services at the macrolevel.[8]

Despite its defects, when feasible the short route is greatly to be preferred over the long route for delivering services of any kind, but for a great many public services is not an option.  One cannot choose which fire department to call to deal with a house aflame, or which public works department to ask to repair a pothole, for these like most public services are monopolies, provided through the long route.  Nor in most local government jurisdictions can one act with neighbors to decide the tradeoff within a town's budget between rebuilding a bridge and offering more services as a health clinic.  Any effort to modify such allocations must move through policymakers and then successive bureaucratic layers and finally the frontline providers.

In some cases, however, the short route can be made an option. Three examples from the education sector will illustrate how both the short routes have been employed to give citizens more power in exercising accountability from providers.  The first shows the choice-of-provider type, while the other two illustrate the direct management type.

- Voucher systems have been employed in Chilean and Colombian school systems with positive impact on student achievement, although teacher opposition in Colombia proved sufficient for the program to be discontinued as a national level effort after a few years (though it was continued on a local basis) (Fiszbein 2005: 29-31).  Education voucher programs have been initiated in a number of other countries as well, including Bangladesh, Côte d'Ivoire and the Czech Republic (Devarajan and Shah 2004: 913-914).

- In a case of citizens playing a direct role in the conduct of school business, a community school monitoring project in El Salvador, in which parents made weekly visits to classrooms, decreased absences (of both teachers and students) and increased student language skills (Jimenez and Sawada 1999).

- A World Bank survey of 12 community empowerment initiatives in primary education found that citizen committees with varying degrees of autonomy (in some cases school officials were included on the com-

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[8]  An exception here would be participatory budgeting in Brazil, which in some cases has been instituted at the state level (Baiocchi 2005).

mittee) exercised considerable control over school planning, fund allocation and in some cases even hiring.[9]

The second (direct involvement) short route of accountability for service delivery can appropriately be seen as a spectrum of state accountability running from citizen control over services to merely receiving citizen complaints, as illustrated in Figure 2.   At the intense end would be a system like Porto Alegre's participatory budgeting in Brazil, in which elected citizen representatives working in tiers from neighborhood up to city level determine public investment allocations and monitor the results on an annual cycle.[10]   Then at the extreme other end would be citizen petitions or even individual complaints to providers, which represent efforts to affect policy but which the providers can accept or ignore as they see fit.

In between the two ends would come a variety of other mechanisms.

- The Philippine Local Government Code of 1991 stipulated that all statutory committees at all local government levels from *barangay* (neighborhood) up to province include NGO participants as 25 percent of their members, with the NGO community in each jurisdiction to select its representatives.  This meant giving NGOs an institutionalized voice at the decision-making table, though of course the statutory committees were not required to heed any proposals put forth by the NGO side, nor was it clear how the NGO representatives would be "selected" (Brilliantes 2007; also Blair 2010).

- Citizen review boards can likewise be effective instruments when given strong state backing.  A good example comes from Mumbai, India, where in the early 1990s, an NGO named *Rationing Kriti Samiti* (Rationing Action Committee) set up local consumer groups to monitor prices and quality in the public distribution system shops, which were widely reported to gouge on prices, stint on quality and siphon off public foodgrain supplies to private channels.  Backed by the government bureaucrat then in charge of rationing, these vigilance committees were able to pressure shopowners to post prices publicly and offer samples for consumer inspection, while periodically reporting their findings to the city government (Goetz and Jenkins 2001).

- Further along the spectrum would be something like what a new managing director of the water and sewage board in Hyderabad, India, put into place in the late 1990s.  His reforms included a 24-hour citizen complaint system with a 4-day turnaround and a "single window cell" to process and install new hookups.  As a result, complaints surged by five times, revenues almost doubled (as more customers proved willing to pay their service bills), and coverage expanded greatly (Caseley 2006).

- A Ugandan experiment with community report cards on public health dispensaries in the mid-2000s led to substantial increases in utilization of the facilities and enhanced health outcomes, when treatment and control areas were compared.  As citizens learned what they were entitled to expect from the public health system and providers learned what citizens wanted, service delivery improved markedly.[11]

- In another version of the citizen report card, an NGO called the Public Affairs Centre in Bangalore, India, launched an initiative in 1994 to gather views of municipal service provision in the water, power, health, and transport sectors.  After successive surveys, the city government did respond positively, which resulted in huge increases in public approval. Whereas those satisfied with water supply and electricity amounted to 4% and 6% respectively in 1994, nine years later in 2003, satisfaction had increased to 73% and 94% (Ravindra 2004). Interestingly, slum households responded to the survey almost as favorably as middle income families, indicating that the improvements were well distributed over the city's population.  It is also worth noting that while the improvements came at first on the initiative of the departments being evaluated, midway through the period a new chief minister of the state became the program's champion and pushed it to enhanced achievements (Paul 2006).  It should be noted that whereas in the Mumbai case described just

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[9]  See Nielsen (2007) for a good summary of the survey, which was analyzed at much greater length in World Bank (2006).

[10]  There are many analyses of this long-running institution.  Among the more perceptive, see Baiocchi (2005), Fung and Wright (2001), Koonings (2004), Wainwright (2003) and World Bank (2008).  For a brief overview, see Blair (2010).

[11]  See Björkman and Svensson (2009).  This study has apparently become quite influential at the Bank in demonstrating the efficacy of short route approaches to state accountability.

previously a government official personally encouraged the citizen reports, in Bangalore the state's role was significantly less active, for it only responded to external interventions.

- A less welcome form of citizen report cards has been those generated by national chapters of Transparency International (TI). In the Mymensingh district of Bangladesh, for example, TI's local chapter sponsored a corruption survey focusing on the primary education system, which did indeed find significant levels of venality. TI announced its findings in press conferences and met with education officials.[12] Here the state had no obligation to respond, but citizen awareness of its problems had certainly increased.

## Civil society as an alternative route

The second short route of citizen involvement in public service provision overlaps in many ways with civil society advocacy, though the two are not the same. Accordingly, it is appropriate here to address directly the topic of civil society and CSOs.

In the late 1980s, Michael Bratton lamented that while CSOs had become a major service providers, they had not attained any serious impact on state policy (Bratton 1989a, 1989b). Several years later John Harbeson and colleagues edited an influential book built around the idea that

> "civil society is a hitherto missing key to sustained political reform, legitimate states and governments, improved governance, viable state-society and state-economy relationships, and prevention of the kind of political decay that undermined new African governments a generation ago (Harbeson 1994: 1-2).

Much more recently, another analyst found civil society filling a more urgent role in Africa, for it is now

> expected to help in both reconstituting the state and contributing to development and democratization objectives. This expectation is based on the potential of civil society to provide the missing key, at both theoretical and policy levels, to sustained political reform, legitimate states and governments, and viable state-society and state-economy relationships, and to prevent the kind of political decay that has undermined African development in the past (Opoku-Mensah 2008: 75).

Such hopes are perhaps more than a bit unrealistic, but a good case can be made for civil society as a path to exacting state accountability for public service delivery, occupying a middle route somewhere between the WDR's long and short routes. Figure 3 shows how civil society might fit in between the two.[13]

CSOs or NGOs can be roughly divided into two types: service organizations and advocacy organizations. The first concentrate mainly on providing services to their constituency (e.g., Girl Scouts, the International Red Cross, sporting clubs, religious institutions), while the second focus principally on trying to affect public policy (e.g., Greenpeace, Amnesty International, the Sierra Club, think tanks). Many CSOs deal in both areas of what amounts to another spectrum. The Audubon Society provides services to its members and lobbies governments to expand bird sanctuaries, while the American Council on Education offers advice to its university members and presses the U.S. Congress to give more subsidies to them. Chambers of commerce and trade union organizations sit largely in the middle of the spectrum, offering services to members and at the same time advocating for their interests with the state. In this paper, though, I will deal only with CSOs in their advocacy role.

CSOs (formal or informal) working as advocacy organizations have many strengths; they:

    A. Can focus on single issues or their components, rather than the fuzzy amalgams of issues involved in elections.

    B. Can use this ability to concentrate on specific goals enables them to become collectively an effective counterweight to the state.

    C. Do not count on positive state support (contrary to most short route mechanisms), though they do depend on state willingness to respond, even if reluctantly.

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[12] See TIB (2001). For an analysis of TI's efforts to enhance state accountability in Bangladesh, see Knox (2009).

[13] There are many approaches to attaining state accountability aside from the three "routes" discussed in this paper. Some can be subsumed under the general rubric of civil society, but others (e.g., public interest lawsuits) fall outside. For a brief overlook of the entire spectrum of such mechanisms, see Blair (forthcoming). I have appended a chart illustrating the spectrum as Annex 2 to the paper.

D.  Can represent the interests of marginal constituencies that would otherwise remain without any effective voice in the polity.

E.  Can in addition to constituencies support more abstract worthy causes (e.g., environment, human rights).

F.  Can target political leaders or providers (or both) directly (as opposed to the indirect linkages characteristic of the long route).

G.  Can include multiple mechanisms (petitions, lobbying, demonstrations, media – not just votes).

Of course, civil society approaches do come with their own problems:

A.  Civil society organizations usually focus on a single issue; accordingly, they can't replace parties, which bundle and reconcile multiple issues to make policy, as part of their role in governance.

B.  Taken together, cacophonous, contradictory CSO demands can easily become an even longer, messier route than elections.

C.  Almost always strapped for operating funds, CSOs all too often find themselves dependent either on donors or Northern NGO/INGO resources, or reliant upon state contracts for delivering services; in either case their autonomy becomes endangered and their ability to act as a counterweight to the state is at risk.

D.  CSOs often claim to represent constituencies when in fact they cater largely to the interests of small elites within those constituencies (e.g., many women's or indigenes' CSOs).  Thus the arrow linking Clients/Citizens to Civil Society in Figure 3 and labeled Representation can in effect be considerably thinner than shown in the diagram.

C & D.  Elites play the advocacy game better than poor and marginal groups, so inequality is likely to increase.

E.  CSOs can support democratically detrimental causes as well as worthwhile ones (anti-minority associations, hate groups, etc.).[14]

It will be noted that many of these strengths and weaknesses amount to opposite sides of the same coin (A & A, B & B, etc.).  These contradictions constitute a fundamental aspect of civil society:  that what is a strong suit in democratization can also be a serious drawback.  Civil society is indeed a mixed bag.

Many CSOs endeavor to affect public service delivery directly by aiming their advocacy at frontline providers.  Those noted in the first four columns of Figure 2 are of this sort.  Others try to lobby the political leaders and decision-makers of the long route, with the idea that they will adjust policies and instruct providers to modify the services that they in turn will deliver.  The Philippine example in Figure 2 is of this type.

It is useful then to modify WDR2004's short route into two routes as depicted in Figure 3.  The new short route (basically the same one set out in WDR2004) includes the two options discussed above (citizen choice of providers and citizen direct involvement, while the new alternative route consists of civil society advocacy, aiming to influence either policy makers or providing organizations or both.  Going back to Figure 2, we can classify the first three columns as examples of civil society advocacy (citizens or CSOs urging the state to change policy), while the second three columns offer cases where the state has given CSOs a role in determining service delivery.  In sum, the distinction is that in the short route, the state has allocated some direct involvement in decision making, however strong (Porto Alegre) or weak (Philippine NGOs) to non-state actors, whereas with civil society advocacy the non-state actors are trying to assert a role in influencing state policy.

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[14]  This unpleasant truth is one often overlooked by donors eager to support civil society.  See Berman's (1997) account of civil society's role in the rise of Nazi Germany for a cautionary tale in this regard.  More recently, in many ways it was Rwanda's strong and dense civil society that precipitated the country's 1994 genocide (See Uvin 1997: 193-179).
Argentina offers an excellent example of civil society's two sides.  In the early 1990s, CSOs were the leading force in pressing the state to undertake judicial reform, aiming in part to end the impunity police had enjoyed.  A dozen years later, however, CSOs were if anything even more active in demanding repressive police behavior to deal with a serious urban crime wave.  On the first, see Blair and Hansen (1994); on the second Eaton (2008).

**Community Driven Development (CDD)**

CDD offers an important variant on the approaches discussed so far. It can be defined as "an approach that gives control of development decisions and resources to community groups. Poor communities receive funds, decide on their use, plan and execute the chosen local projects, and monitor the provision of services that result." (World Bank 2009: 2). As of now, it doesn't fit easily within the rubric of the WDR2004 routes, for while some CDD projects correspond nicely to the short route in that give citizen groups involvement in local government decision making, others have no link to public service delivery providers.

Although CDD can be traced back into the 1950s and before with various beneficiary participation programs, it began in a major way at the Bank in the 1990s and has since expanded to the point where it now comprises some 50 projects and lends about US$1.9 billion annually (World Bank 2009). The largest CDD effort presently is Indonesia's Kecamatan Development Program (KDP, now known by its Indonesian acronym PNPM Mandiri) covering 50k villages in 3900 *kecamatan* (sub-districts, of which there are just under 5400 nationwide) in 30 provinces (PNPM Mandiri 2010). Africa has a large number of CDD programs in place as well (Serrano-Berthet 2008).

A key factor in CDD lies in whether and to what extent and how the community groups (often referred to as community-based organizations or CBOs) work with state institutions, in particular local governments. These consist of at least three distinct types. First, in many World Bank (and other donor assisted) projects, CBOs in effect bypass elected local governments to allocate investment funds. The Indonesian KDP in its earlier years offers an excellent (and highly successful) instance of this approach, though as the program matured it developed successively closer links to local state institutions (Guggenheim et al. 2004; Guggenheim 2006). Second, in other programs, the CBOs work with local governments to establish priorities, with the funds actually being allocated by the latter. Indonesia's musrenbang program provides a somewhat less successful case here.[15] Third, in still other programs, CBOs in fact determine the allocations, with the governments undertaking the implementation. Bolivia's Vigilance Committees serve as an illustration of this type.[16] A recent World Bank study of 36 CDD projects, found 11 operations completely managed by CBOs and 14 co-managed by some combination of CBOs and local government (though the report does not distinguish between my second and third types; see Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2009: ch 4, esp p 89).

There appears to be no question that CDD initiatives can succeed on a pilot scale, where an outside donor can concentrate capacity building (within the CBOs and also NGOs and state institutions) to the degree required. The key issue is whether CDD can be scaled up to regional or national level. A Bank assessment asserts that they can be, provided that real devolution empowers communities and local governments, accountability becomes aligned downward to citizens, and capacity is built.[17] Political will is not explicitly included in the list, but it is arguably the main requisite for a successful devolution of power from the center, and probably the rock on which most decentralization efforts have foundered in the past (see Manor 1999; also Blair 2000). The KDP, with its 50,000 villages shows that CDD programs can definitely be scaled up, but whether it could be continued without massive donor support is another question.

## Non-state actor impact on accountability: quantitative evidence

There have been many accounts of non-state impact on state accountability for public service delivery, but most of them have been essentially qualitative. Very few studies reflect rigorous quantitative evidence addressing the central question of impact: Have social accountability mechanisms enabled nonstate actors to successfully press state institutions to modify public service delivery?

Among the small number of quantitative studies have been the two Uganda analyses noted earlier (Björkman and Svensson 2009; Reinikka and Svensson 2007), as well as the Bangalore reports by Ravindra (2004) and Paul (2006).

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[15] In this type of program, the citizen role amounts largely to making wish lists, which local councils are required to look at, but they can and often do ignore these inputs.

[16] Porto Alegre could also be considered in the third type. For a brief account of all these examples, see Blair (2010).

[17] Binswanger et al. (2009: 4 et passim). Their report specifies "five pillars" as essential, but I believe they can be condensed to the three noted in the text above. See also Davis (2003?).

Further Uganda study (Deininger and Mpuga 2005) found that increased knowledge about corruption and how to report it correlated with greater satisfaction with public services, indicating that those who could potentially hold providers accountable (by reporting corruption) received better services than those who could not. Not surprisingly, those possessing this greater knowledge tended to be more educated and wealthier.

Rajkumar and Swaroop's (2008) analysis of "good governance" and efficacy of public spending on health and education in 91 countries. But their GG measures center on a corruption index and a "bureaucratic quality" score, neither of which constitutes demand side accountability mechanism of the sort covered in this paper.

Porto Alegre has been studied extensively and intensively. After PB had been in place for well over a decade, it became possible to undertake serious studies of its impact on poverty and well-being. Studies by Marquetti (2003, cited in Boulding and Wampler 2009) and the World Bank (2008) found that PB did reduce poverty rates, while increasing access to well-being measures like piped water and sewage treatment. But a later study based on 220 Brazilian cities showed no real PB impact on broader well-being indices such as infant mortality, life expectancy or literacy, although it did decrease poverty (Boulding and Wampler 2009). The authors did not doubt the substantial evidence indicating that improvements in empowerment, government efficiency and accountability had made progress, however.

Parmesh Shah's (2008, 2009) two PowerPoint presentations indicate that some quantitative research was done on the World Bank's Andhra Pradesh projects, though there's little description of what the projects actually entailed (e.g., were they demand-driven? If so, how? And so on). Misra and Ramasankar's (2007) note on community health score cards in Andhra Pradesh has similar limitations.

But the vast majority of studies about accountability are more qualitative, employing more anthropological approaches. Many are excellent pieces of work, providing a deep picture of local empowerment and policy impact (e.g., Fox 2008; Hochstetler and Keck 2007; Shefner 2008, all on Latin America – the situation with respect to South Asia is basically similar). But they do not give hard measures of impact and outcome. For Africa, scholars like Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Welle (1997) have produced excellent studies on the state of democratization, but they also tend toward the anthropological rather than the quantitative, even though both have much experience with quantitative methodology (Bratton for example is a major originator and promoter of the Afrobarometer survey program).

USAID sponsored a report appearing in 2008 that urged more quantitative evaluations in the democracy sector, including randomized samples with baseline studies, treatment and control groups, etc., (Committee on Evaluation 2008), and several such studies have been launched, but to date none have actually appeared.


## What's different about Africa: qualitative measures

Sub-Saharan Africa definitely has a presence in social accountability studies. Carmen Malena's (2009) survey of "anecdata" focused on the impact of DFGG approaches as reported in dozens of analyses. She reports on 106 examples (all of them successful in one way or another – increasing voice, promoting accountability, or both (though measurable outcomes are not her focus), 44 of them in Africa and 62 from elsewhere. While there is no special reason to think her sample was a scientifically random one (she makes no claim to that effect), the fact that more than two-fifths of the total were situated in Africa indicates that social accountability efforts have established some presence in a variety of settings in the region.

In mid-decade, the Bank launched a stocktaking exercise focusing on social accountability initiatives in its various regions. The African report (McNeil and Mumvuma 2006) looked at some 28 Bank projects dealing with public budgets in 10 Anglophone countries. The report and conferences held to discuss it found that CSOs had attained sufficient capability to analyze public budgets, track expenditures and monitor performance that public officials had not only taken notice of their efforts but had responded favorably. Budgets became more transparent and citizen awareness increased.

But it's not clear what the initiatives accomplished in terms of exercising accountability vis-à-vis state institutions. Budgets may have become more transparent, but did the allocations become more responsive to citizen concerns (e.g., more spent on medicines for health dispensaries, less spent on increasing staff)? Was there increased competition for local government contracts? Such questions are not raised in the report. And how much public demand actually exists for social accountability? It is clear that there is a high *need* for it (as there is everywhere), but need

does not by itself prove that *demand* also exists, contrary to the report's assertions (McNeil and Mumvuma 2006: vii & 22-23).

Opoku-Mensah (2008) summarizes the Civicus survey of civil society experience in four of Civicus's six African countries, finding CSOs to be good at service delivery and promoting participation in donor-driven activities like PRSPs. At the same time, they showed little impact through advocacy. In addition, CSOs tend to be elite-led, urban based, and generally dealing with central govt and donors, rather than focused on rural areas, the poor, and minorities. The big challenge in his mind is whether civil society can move its present "docile role" centering on service delivery and government subcontracts to one emphasizing autonomy and advocacy.

In their close examination of 7 countries (including 3 in Africa) and 57 donor-supported projects aiming to promote V&A (of which 21 were located in Africa), Rocha Menocal and Sharma (2008) found considerably more Voice than Accountability, both for African countries and their sample population as a whole  In Africa, 10 of the 21 projects focused only on civil society Voice, while 3 worked only on Accountability of state and political institutions and 8 aimed at both. The authors adduced several reasons why Voice got the most attention:

- Host country governments were often reluctant to support initiatives designed to emphasize Accountability.

- The huge expansion of CSOs in recent years meant that donors found more opportunities to work with Voice.

- Donors tended to assume that increased Voice would in itself lead to increased Accountability (Rocha Menocal and Sharma, 2008: 24-25).

The authors could have added that pressures on donors to report quick and easily tabulated results would have led them to prioritize Voice (measurable as journalists trained, appearances at public hearings, monitoring efforts launched) over Accountability (which would entail assessing policies both altered and then implemented, decision-making processes and records actually released, etc.).

In sum, the authors found that even where successful, changes emanating from V&A efforts tended to be confined to the level of behavior and practice rather than policy and power relations. This lighter level of change (e.g., greater access to development funds and audits inducing more responsiveness from state courts in Mozambique) can be important, to be sure, but it has been unsystematic, local, isolated, and probably unscalable, the authors conclude (Rocha Menocal and Sharma, 2008: 41).


**What's different about Africa:  quantitative measures**

A number of cross-national governance measures are available, such as those compiled by Freedom House, the Polity surveys, and Transparency International. But for a paper dealing with citizen voice and accountability, the Bank's own Voice and Accountability (V&A) index, as reported in its Governance Matters series, appears clearly the best choice. The V&A measure, an aggregate of some 20 indices compiled by various survey firms, NGO databases, commercial organizations, etc., endeavors to capture "perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media" (Kaufmann et al. 2009: 6). This seems as good a definition of the demand side of governance as any available, and the V&A measure includes an excellent array of countries for our purposes:  48 in Africa and 145 from other regions.[18] In addition, the fact that the V&A index has now been calculated and published eight times over the 1996-2008 period facilitates analysis of change over time, as will be illustrated later on.

To begin with the UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI) as an overall measure of individual well being as presented in Figure 4's boxplots, it comes as no surprise to find the Africa region with a lower mean score (.522 on the HDI's 2007[19] range, which went from .340 to .971) than any other region. Even South Asia's mean is more than 100 points higher at .633).[20]

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[18]  The total 193 countries is smaller than the WGI global total of 212 for 2008. The dataset used here includes only countries for which V&A data were available for 1996, 2007 and 2008, as well as data from Freedom House, Transparency International and the UNDP's Human Development reports.

[19]  The latest available data for the HDI covers 2007. Because it doesn't change that much from year to year, I have used it to compare with WGI data for that same year, though strictly speaking it would make sense to lag the HDI

Figure 5 shows boxplots for all the regions on the 2008 V&A measure, and here also Africa with a mean of – .580 lags behind the global average of – .050, but the former Soviet states (FS) lag even further (mean = – .618) and South Asia is only just a bit better (– .500). Asia-Pacific has a higher mean (– .034) but its variation covers about the same range. Africa's V&A in short looks more like some other regions than is the case with the HDI.

How does V&A relate to the HDI? As might be anticipated from looking at Figures 4 and 5, correlations are rather middling at best. For all regions the Pearson correlation is .555 ($r^2$ = .301), and for the Africa reason, it comes to only .337 ($r^2$ = .116) for 2007, meaning that while globally about 30% of the variance in HDI can be statistically accounted for by V&A, for Africa it is less than 12%. So not only is V&A less developed in Africa and the HDI less advanced, but the relationship between the two is significantly looser (i.e., lower $r^2$). Assuming that there is some causal relationship here, the implication is that to the extent it exists, V&A has not had the same impact on human development in Africa as elsewhere.[21]

Even so, a 30% relationship is a great deal better than none, and it is arguably the linkage between citizens and the political leadership that is expressed in V&A that has driven human development advances in the advanced world over time, as WDR2004 intimates (World Bank 2003: 79) and as much of Western history and more recent Indian history would confirm. All three of our accountability routes depend critically on V&A, though of course many other factors both exogenous and endogenous come into explanatory play in determining human development progress. More important, V&A at least at the margins is arguably more amenable to donor interventions than such variables as cultural factors (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Etounga-Manguelle 2000), civil unrest, natural resource endowment, etc. So even though it does not appear to be as powerful a force as one would like to believe, V&A nonetheless has considerable potency as a change agent. And in the end, if public service delivery is to be account-able to a country's citizens, it will have to become so through the exercise of V&A. Accordingly, we need to assess V&A's prospects in the Africa regions.

Figure 6 correlates Africa region V&A scores with HDI scores for 2007. Two groups of countries stand out in the scattergram. First, several outliers distort the overall relationship of V&A with HDI because they have been able to raise HDI scores without concomitant accountability. Equatorial Guinea and Gabon have battened on natural re-source extraction while maintaining authoritarian rule but increasing social spending, and the Seychelles have bene-fited from impressive tourist spending. More interestingly, a group of countries in the upper right of the scattergram have achieved creditable V&A scores and have been doing relatively well in promoting human development. Bots-wana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa range between the 58th and 33rd percentiles on HDI, consi-derably ahead of the African average at the 22nd percentile. For this group of countries at the top of both V&A and

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readings several years behind the WGI figures on the thought that any causal linkages could only work out over time.

[20] The larger rectangle for each region in Figures 4 and 5 shows where the middle 50% of the cases lie, and the thin I-bar shows where about 95% (two standard deviations) are located. The heavier bar across the large rectangle indi-cates the median case.

I have taken some liberties in defining "regions" for this paper. Africa (AF in Figures 4 & ff. with 48 cases) re-mains the same set of Sub-Saharan countries that the Bank uses, and Asia-Pacific (AP with 31 cases) also remains unchanged, but I have modified other regions to facilitate comparison as follows:

CR      Caribbean countries (12)
EE      East European countries formerly in the Soviet Bloc or part of Yugoslavia, plus Cyprus and Greece (15)
FS      Countries formerly part of the Soviet Union (15)
LA      Latin America (21)
ME      Middle East (20)
SA      South Asia (7)
WE      Western Europe, also including Canada and the United States (24)

A revised version of this exercise could profitably introduce further modifications, for instance removing advanced countries like Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Singapore from the AP region.

[21] Perhaps there is a threshold to be crossed, such that when V&A passes enough a certain level in enough countries within a region, a sufficient inertial momentum has accumulated to improve service delivery in ways that promote human development. Such an argument might be made for Latin America, but cultural heterogeneity is much lower there than in Africa. In any case, though, this interpretation is highly speculative, to say the least.

HDI scores, there must be something connecting the two measures, just as there would seem to be something behind the low scores on both indices for countries like Chad, the DRC and Eritrea on the other end of the scale.

How much has V&A improved or declined since the WGI team began their studies in the mid-1990s? Figure 7 presents a scattergram comparing V&A scores in 1996 and 2008 for all 156 countries not classified as in Eastern or Western Europe.[22] Not surprisingly, the relationship is quite strong ($r^2$ = .828), for most countries with high V&A scores in 1996 remained high in 2008, and similarly for those with low scores. African countries, denoted by circles in the scattergram, fell all over the pattern, though with fewer at the top right and more toward the lower left, as would be anticipated from Figure 4's distribution. Thus as a whole Africa does not stand off to the side in V&A but is squarely in the mainstream of the global picture, if at a bit slower pace

What is more interesting, though, is which countries moved away from their 1996 V&A status a dozen years later. In Figure 7, the countries represented above and to the left of the diagonal regression line improved their status relative to the others over the 12 years, while those below and to the right declined.

Figure 8 brings the V&A picture to the Africa region. Here the correlation between the two years is significantly looser, showing an $r^2$ of .651, a good deal less than the .828 recorded for the global population in Figure 7. In other words, 1996 V&A was a less reliable predictor of the 2008 V&A position, reflecting a greater volatility in African governance over the 1996-2008 period than for the world as a whole. A larger proportion of African countries improved V&A to a greater degree than could have been predicted from 1996, while at the same time a bigger fraction also declined more than could have been foreseen.

This greater volatility comes out in Figure 9, which depicts the residuals from the regression exercise of Figure 8. Countries on the left with values greater than zero did better over the dozen-year period in terms of V&A than their 1996 position would have led us to predict, while those on the right with values successively declining did worse. Nigeria's score (the leftmost bar in Figure 8) improved the most, though it began in 1996 close to the bottom of the pack, while Eritrea (rightmost bar) declined the most precipitously. Ghana offers a good example of a system that began relatively well in 1996 and then improved significantly (third highest advance after Nigeria and Liberia).

These impressions are reinforced by the Civicus data presented in Figure 10. which presents a correlation scatterplot for two of the four Civicus "civil society diamond" dimensions: Values and Impact. "Values" measures to what extent a country's CSOs incorporate democracy, transparency, tolerance, gender equity, etc., in their makeup, while "impact" gauges how much civil society is able to influence public policy, hold the state accountable, meet societal needs, etc. Of the six African countries included in the Civicus sample, three (Ghana, Nigeria and Uganda) show up well compared with the global sample, two (Mozambique and Togo) come out noticeably worse, and one (Sierra Leone) rests in the middle of the whole group.

## Implications for donors

We know from "anecdata" like Malena's (2009) and case studies like the two reported from Uganda (Björkman and Svensson 2009; Reinikka and Svensson 2007) that civil society in Africa can succeed in getting the state's attention and in changing its behavior, though evidence of impact on actual policy is thin, at least in part because so few rigorous studies have been done. We also know from the quantitative data presented in this paper that Africa contains a number of countries that compare quite favorably with other regions on Voice and Accountability measures. And finally we know that several countries have made considerable progress in V&A over the dozen years that the Bank's Governance Matters team has been tracking this index.

Based on this understanding, it is possible to make some suggestions for donor interventions, which are summarized in Figure 11, which depicts several clusters that can be identified from Figure 8 as follows:

I.      **Good and improving states** (Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa). Civil society in countries which have not "graduated" from donor assistance should be encouraged to move further along the advocacy track.

II.     **Earlier progress stalled** (Benin, Madagascar, Mali, São Tome & Principe). Though it was doing well in 1996 and is still impressive, civil society momentum appears to have slowed somewhat or even declined in these states. Donor assistance can help get it back on track.

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[22] I have shifted Canada and the US to "Europe" for the purposes of this exercise.

III.  **Good recent progress** (Ghana, Kenya, Niger, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Zambia). Ghana is the outstanding case here, but in this cluster generally V&A has shown substantial improvement since 1996 relative to other African countries. Support to civil society can maintain this momentum.

IV.  **Little traction**. This large group of countries (essentially all those not included in other groupings) remains about where it was in 1996 relative to other African states. There has been some good experience among them (e.g., the two case studies in Uganga), but they have not shown the same promise as those in group III.

V.  **Bad cases improving** (Burundi, Liberia, Nigeria). The most dramatic upward shift in V&A came in these three countries, which moved from 1996's bottom V&A quartile to the upper half in 2008. This impressive V&A momentum should be nurtured over the near term.

VI.  **Rapid decliners** (Central African Republic, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Côte d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe). Assistance to civil society in these states would have to focus on stalling further decline and reversing it.

VII.  **Continuing bad performers** (Equatorial Guinea, Somalia, Sudan, DRC). These states have changed little in V&A terms from their bottom-rank status in 1996. Any support not directed toward service delivery would probably not be productive in the near future.

I have probably been too ambitious in this classification, and surely I have misclassified a number of cases here. Perhaps it would make more sense to point only to groups I, II, III and V as showing that a careful examination of quantitative evidence can give some insight on where the best promise for civil society progress lies.

In any case, the main point here and the main central point of the paper is that in a region where the long route of accountability has essentially stalled out in most countries as an avenue to improving public service delivery, the short and civil society routes offer attractive paths for donor assistance. Case studies show that both these approaches can work as well in Africa as anywhere, and quantitative evidence indicates that a good number of African countries would be excellent candidates for increased assistance along these lines.

More specifically, I would want to know if there are any differences **among** these 7 groups in terms of cultural and political context that makes them different from other groups. Are the countries in Group I collectively different from those in Group II, etc.? Or are differences **within** my groups really as great (or greater) than those between them (obviously I am making an analogy to the statistical ANOVA approach here). If the former, the key factor might be legal systems differentiating Group I from Group II, corruption distinguishing III from IV, and so on. Then we could ask what donors might do to encourage Group II countries to become more like Group I. Assuming that political change is more feasible than cultural change, should we support bureaucratic reform in Group II, or improving the legal environment, state attitude toward civil society, etc.? I suspect such an exercise would indicate that supporting civil society would be more productive toward enhancing V&A in some groups of countries than in others.

The taxonomy I suggested for Figure 11 is only suggestive. I can think of several ways to approach this, some of which are likely to prove superior to my relatively simplistic zero-order correlations. A better analysis could proceed from opposition directions. One could begin with the measures as I have done and see where the countries fall, perhaps using all the *Governance Matters* indices, along with CPI, HDI, the Polity study, etc., in something like a discriminant analysis (or maybe even factor analysis). Conversely, one could start with the countries that seem to fit together (e.g., Southern Africa, post-conflict states, former dictatorships, newly emerging electoral democracies) to see if the groupings have statistical support from the various indices like V&A (cluster analysis would be the statistical approach here, I imagine).

I've undertaken two further brief forays into statistical analysis. For three-fifths to three-quarters of the twentieth century, most of Africa was governed by colonial regimes, each of which had its own approach to social development. It would be surprising if this history did not have some impact on political culture today, and so it is worthwhile asking if there is a detectable relationship between colonial regime and present day governance. Accordingly, I have looked into a possible link between them in Annex 3 at the end of the paper. Literacy is sometimes thought of as a primary building block of democratic practice, and so I have briefly explored its connection to governance in Annex 4. As it turns out, neither colonial history nor literacy can account statistically for much of the variation in governance (at least insofar is governance can be captured in the Bank's Voice and Accountability measure). But I

have only scratched the surface here with simple correlations and one-way ANOVA tests. There is a great deal more that could be done.

A second line of suggestion relates to sustainability. Donors generally concern themselves with designing new projects and implementing ongoing ones. Sometimes they carry out mid-term evaluations with a view toward course correction, and less frequently they take up end-of-project assessments to glean lessons learned. What they virtually never do is conduct (or sponsor) post-project studies to see what lasting impact a project may have had. A truly worthwhile enterprise benefiting the entire international development community would be for the Bank to undertake post-project impact assessments of some of the few efforts that have been rigorously evaluated during their implementation.

Some five years has now elapsed since the Uganda health and education projects were assessed (Bjorkman and Svensson 2009; Reinikka and Svensson 2007). Has there been any discernable lasting impact? The Bangalore citizen report card initiative was quite successful, according to measurements taken in 2003, in significant part because the state's chief minister became its primary champion. But he was replaced by a new chief minister in 2004 who was evidently less enthusiastic (Paul 2006). How much if any of the initiative now carries on? Participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre survived the replacement of the city's mayor after several terms (Baiocchi 2005); Bangalore's experience would be worth harvesting, as would that of the two Uganda efforts. To do a follow-up study of these examples would not be very costly and could make a real contribution, for after all, if these experiments cannot institutionalize themselves past the hothouse atmosphere of a pilot phase, they do not have a great deal to teach us.

The prospect here is an exiting one and hopefully would produce some real potential for crafting a set of CV&A strategies to fit the different groups of states, such that donors might promote direct citizen involvement mechanisms in some, citizen choice of vendors in others, building advocacy capacity into service delivery NGOs in a third group, and so on.

All this would mean more research, of course, and so may seem self-serving from an academic like me, but I think it makes some sense to ascertain whether there are patterns like those I am suggesting (or others). If I am wrong and there are few or no patterns, we are back to thinking in terms of regional strategy templates (community development, integrated rural development, structural adjustment, etc.) combined with tweakings made for individual cases – essentially the same approach we as donors have tried for the last five or six decades and which has been found so wanting in so much of the Africa region.

**Figure 1**
**The long and short routes to accountability for service delivery**

The state:
politicians &
policymakers

VOICE

COMPACT

LONG ROUTE OF ACCOUNTABILITY

SHORT ROUTE OF ACCOUNTABILITY

Clients/
citizens

DIRECT INVOLVEMENT

Providers
(frontline &
organizations)

SERVICES

Adapted from: World Development Report, 2004: 49

Figure 2

# Spectrum of accountability with direct citizen involvement

LOW ← LEVEL OF STATE ACCOUNTABILITY → HIGH

|  | Citizen complaints & petitions | Unwanted citizen rpt card | Welcome citizen rpt card | Citizen review board | Manda- tory CSO partic | Partici- patory budgets |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ORIGIN | Citizens or CSO | CSO | CSO | CSO & state | State | State |
| DEGREE OF STRUCTURE | Very little | CSO de- termined | Ad hoc | State de- termined | Loose | Very tight |
| STATE RESPONSE | Discre- tionary | Discre- tionary | Discre- tionary | Champion within | Listen only | Comply |
| EXAMPLES | Many places | TI Bangla- desh | Uganda health, Bangalore surveys | Mumbai food rationing | Philippines local govt code | Porto Alegre |

## Figure 3
### An alternate middle route to accountability



Adapted from: World Development Report, 2004: 49

## Figure 4
### Boxplots for Human Development Scores by region, 2007

### Figure 5
## Boxplots for Voice & Accountability by region, 2008



### Figure 6
## Voice & Accountability and HDI scores in Africa region, 2007
(for country codes, see Figure 6a)

## Figure 6a
## Africa country codes for Governance Matters data

| Code | Country | Code | Country | Code | Country |
|------|---------|------|---------|------|---------|
| AGO | ANGOLA | GIN | GUINEA | RWA | RWANDA |
| BDI | BURUNDI | GMB | GAMBIA | SDN | SUDAN |
| BEN | BENIN | GNB | GUINEA-BISSAU | SEN | SENEGAL |
| BFA | BURKINA FASO | GNQ | EQUAT GUINEA | SLE | SIERRA LEONE |
| BWA | BOTSWANA | KEN | KENYA | SOM | SOMALIA |
| CAF | CENT AFR REP | LBR | LIBERIA | STP | STOME & PRINCIP |
| CIV | COTE D'IVOIRE | LSO | LESOTHO | SWZ | SWAZILAND |
| CMR | CAMEROON | MDG | MADAGASCAR | SYC | SEYCHELLES |
| COG | CONGO | MLI | MALI | TCD | CHAD |
| COM | COMOROS | MOZ | MOZAMBIQUE | TGO | TOGO |
| CPV | CAPE VERDE | MRT | MAURITANIA | TZA | TANZANIA |
| DJI | DJIBOUTI | MUS | MAURITIUS | UGA | UGANDA |
| ERI | ERITREA | MWI | MALAWI | ZAF | SOUTH AFRICA |
| ETH | ETHIOPIA | NAM | NAMIBIA | ZAR | DEM REP CONGO |
| GAB | GABON | NER | NIGER | ZMB | ZAMBIA |
| GHA | GHANA | NGA | NIGERIA | ZWE | ZIMBABWE |

## Figure 7
## Voice & Accountability in developing regions, 1996 and 2008



1996 mean = −.251
2008 mean = −.295
r = .910
$r^2$ = .828
V&A2008 = −.077 + .880(V&A1996)
Sig. = <.001

Figure 8

## Voice & Accountability in Africa region, 1996 and 2008



1996 mean = −.564
2008 mean = −.580
r = .807, $r^2$ = .651
V&A2008 = −.134 + .790(V&A1996)
Sig. = <.001

$R^2$ Linear = 0.651

Figure 9

## Voice & Accountability 2008: Unstandardized residuals from regression on V&A1996



The bars indicate the extent to which actual values for V&A 2008 differ from what a regression on V&A 1996 would predict. For NGA (Nigeria) the predicted value was − 1.66 but the actual value was − 0.50, a difference of +0.96, which is the value shown by the leftmost bar. Liberia made the nextmost progress (+0.92), followed by Ghana (+0.84), Burundi (+0.69) and Kenya (+0.63).

On the negative side, Eritrea fell the furthest (− 1.20 below predicted value, followed by Zimbabwe (− 0.89). For many other states, the V&A1996 reading served as quite an exact predictor of their 2008 positions. Sudan, Somalia and DRC improved scarcely at all from their dismal 1996 showings, while South Africa, Botswana, Mali and Benin maintained the relatively good track records they had set in the earlier year.

Figure 10

## Civicus Values & Impact scores in developing regions, 2003-2006



Figure 11

## V&A types and implications for donors

Annex 1.
# References

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Annex 2.

## Social accountability mechanisms and their origins



**Mode of state support**

- 🟥 Championship
- 🟧 Strong backing
- 🟨 Encouragement
- 🟩 Stat endorsement
- 🟩 Acceptance
- 🟦 Consent
- 🟦 Acquiescence
- 🟦 Disinterest
- 🟪 Forbearance
- 🟪 Grudging assent

| State posture | Mode of state support | Mechanism | Source of authority | Requirements for success | State finan-cing? | Nat'l/Local |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Active | Champ-ionship | Participatory budgeting (Porto Alegre, Brazil) | Executive leadership | Executive commitment | Y | L |
| | | Decentralization program (many examples) | Legislative act + implementation | Political will | Y | L |
| | Strong backing | Ombudsman (Philippines) | Legislative act + implementation | Ombudsman authority to redress | Y | N |
| | | Statutory oversight board (Vigilance Committees, Bolivia) | Executive leadership + legislative act | Citizen competence, executive commitment | Y | L |
| | | Citizen review board (Rationing Committee, Mumbai) | Executive leadership + citizen activism | Citizen competence, executive cooperation | N | L |
| | Encour-agement | Citizen report cards (Bangalore, India) | Civil society | Citizen competence, executive responsiveness | N | L |
| | Statutory endorse-ment | Elections (many examples) | Constitution | Outside monitoring | Y | L |
| | | Legislative oversight (African parliaments) | Constitution | Legislative autonomy + abandoning patronage orientation | Y | N |
| Passive | Accept-ance | Civil society advocacy & lobbying (many cases) | Civil society activism | Genuine pluralism & competition | N | N or L |
| | Consent | Public interest law suits (Delhi air pollution case) | Constitution | Independent judiciary | N | N |
| | Acquies-cence | Media (many cases) | Constitution | Executive restraint | N | N |
| | Disinter-est | Privatization (market exercises accountability – many cases) | Executive decision and/or legislative act | Market competition | N | N |
| | Forbear-ance | Human rights organizations (Amnesty Intl; Human Rights Watch) | International pressure | Executive restraint + independent media | N | N |
| | | Corruption report card (Mymensingh, Bangladesh) | Civil society activism | Executive restraint | N | L |
| | Grudging assent | Demonstrations ++ (Estrada ouster; Orange Revolution) | Citizen movements | Executive restraint | N | N or L |

Source:  Blair (forthcoming).

Annex 3.
**Colonial history as an explanatory variable**

What can colonial history tell us about the scope for enhancing state accountability to citizens? Are there some real differences between the ex-colonies of one European country and another that can provide useful information about demand side governance today, and possibly indicate fruitful avenues for future donor assistance? In this annex, I'll explore these questions using the Bank's Voice and Accountability indices for 1996 and 2008 that have been the principal measures employed in the paper.

Figure 12 takes the presentation from Figure 11 as it appeared in the paper and adds in the colonial experience for all 48 African states.



Figure 12
V&A in 1996 & 2008 and colonial history

As expected, former British colonies do better, French ones not so good, though with some exceptions (Mali, Benin doing well if not progressing, and Madagascar doing significantly better than most African states).

Interestingly, Portuguese colonies do even better than the formerly British ones. Check out the tables below. Table A shows the ex-Portuguese countries on average doing better than ex-British states, both in 1996 and 2008. That's because of Cape Verde and Sao Tome pulling up the average, but Mozambique is in there too. So it's the means that are of interest. Did the Portuguese colonials do anything particularly well? I had always thought of them as pretty bad actors, but maybe there's something I don't know about.

On the whole, though, it's the ex-British states that are the leaders here (with some notorious exceptions, e.g., Sudan, Zimbabwe and certainly Nigeria until recently), with their group average improving from -.4146 to -.2316. Since these countries are scattered all over Sub-Saharan Africa, we can't attribute their collectively superior performance to geography. A look at the Group I countries ("Good and improving") in Figure 12 shows 4 of 5 to be former British colonies, and in Group III ("Good recent progress") it's 6 out of 7. At the other end, among Group VI ("Rapid decliners") only 1 of 7 (or 2 of 9, depending on how I draw the elipse) are British, and in Group VII ("Continuing bad performers") it's 1 out of 4. Pretty impressive.

How can the differences be explained? The small population of countries makes any statistical testing for the whole population difficult here, though it is possible to make some inferences. If we take only the former British (n=18), French (n=17) and Portuguese (n=5) colonies, the numbers are still too small to do any valid statistical testing for the three main groups, but simply looking at the means for the groups (Table B) and conducting what might be called a faux-ANOVA test should reveal any interesting differences. Tables B and C below do this using the V&A 2008 score and then Tables D and E for a number of Freedom House (FH) measures for 2008. Political Rights and Civil Liberties are the principal FH indices, each ranging between 1 (the best score) and 7 (the worst). On both measures, the ex-Portuguese colonies do best and the ex-French ones worst, as is evident from the mean scores. Our faux-ANOVA shows the differences between the three groups to be not that much greater than those within the groups, such that the F statistic is not significant even at the 10-percent level.

Freedom House has disaggregated its main Political Rights and Civil Liberties indices into seven subscores, which I've also included here in Tables D and E. For each of them, the scoring is reversed, so that the worst level is zero and the best 12 or 16, depending on the measure involved.[23] Here we see that the FH Pluralism and Participation index (a measure of political competitiveness) shows the highest difference between our three groups (sig <.10), just about the same as the Bank's V&A2008 index. None of the other FH subscores show much difference. In particular, it might be noted that the Associational Rights score (which gauges civil society rights) is the least powerful FH subscore in terms of differentiating between colonial histories (sig < .40).

Overall, while they display some interesting patterns, the colonial histories of Sub-Saharan African states do not tell us much about differences in Voice and Accountability between present-day political systems. And they do not indicate any particular avenues for donor intervention, such as focusing on Rule of Law in one set of ex-colonies and media in another. The differences between the groups are just not that much greater than those within them.

Table A.
V&A 1996 and 1998:  Means and standard deviations by colonial regime

| Colonial history | | V&A 1996 | V&A 2008 |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Mean | -1.0968 | -.7939 |
| | N | 2 | 2 |
| | Std. Deviation | .37545 | .71209 |
| BEL | Mean | -1.4966 | -1.1237 |
| | N | 3 | 3 |
| | Std. Deviation | .15351 | .41884 |
| FRA | Mean | -.4542 | -.7102 |
| | N | 17 | 17 |
| | Std. Deviation | .60368 | .55820 |

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[23] For an explanation of the subscores, see the Freedom House website at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=341&year=2008.

| | | | |
|---|---|---:|---:|
| ITL | Mean | -1.4991 | -2.0241 |
| | N | 2 | 2 |
| | Std. Deviation | .57644 | .24915 |
| POR | Mean | -.1069 | -.1360 |
| | N | 5 | 5 |
| | Std. Deviation | .89995 | .81123 |
| SPA | Mean | -1.6778 | -1.8898 |
| | N | 1 | 1 |
| | Std. Deviation | . | . |
| UKG | Mean | -.4146 | -.2316 |
| | N | 18 | 18 |
| | Std. Deviation | .85233 | .75532 |
| Total | Mean | -.5641 | -.5796 |
| | N | 48 | 48 |
| | Std. Deviation | .79571 | .77952 |

Table B.

V&A 1996 and 1998:  Means and standard deviations for former British, French and Portuguese colonies

**Report**

| Colonial Regime | | V&A 1996 | V&A 2008 |
|---|---|---|---|
| British | Mean | -.4146 | -.2316 |
| | N | 18 | 18 |
| | Std. Deviation | .85233 | .75532 |
| French | Mean | -.4542 | -.7102 |
| | N | 17 | 17 |
| | Std. Deviation | .60368 | .55820 |
| Portuguese | Mean | -.1069 | -.1360 |
| | N | 5 | 5 |
| | Std. Deviation | .89995 | .81123 |
| Total | Mean | -.3930 | -.4231 |
| | N | 40 | 40 |
| | Std. Deviation | .74939 | .71234 |

Table C.

V&A 1996 and 1998:  One-way Analysis of Variance for former British, French and Portuguese colonies

**ANOVA Table**

| | | | Sum of Squares | df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V&A 1996 * Colonial Regime | Between Groups | (Combined) | .481 | 2 | .241 | .416 | .663 |
| | Within Groups | | 21.420 | 37 | .579 | | |
| | Total | | 21.902 | 39 | | | |
| V&A 2008 * Colonial Regime | Between Groups | (Combined) | 2.473 | 2 | 1.237 | 2.642 | .085 |
| | Within Groups | | 17.316 | 37 | .468 | | |
| | Total | | 19.790 | 39 | | | |

Table D.
Freedom House variables in African countries classified by British/French/Portuguese colonial experience

|  |  | N | Mean | Std. Deviation | Minimum | Maximum |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FH Political rights | British | 18 | 3.67 | 1.940 | 1 | 7 |
|  | French | 17 | 4.65 | 1.656 | 2 | 7 |
|  | Portuguese | 5 | 3.20 | 1.924 | 1 | 6 |
|  | Total | 40 | 4.03 | 1.860 | 1 | 7 |
| FH Civil liberties | British | 18 | 3.50 | 1.425 | 2 | 7 |
|  | French | 17 | 4.24 | 1.147 | 2 | 6 |
|  | Portuguese | 5 | 3.00 | 1.581 | 1 | 5 |
|  | Total | 40 | 3.75 | 1.373 | 1 | 7 |
| Electoral Process | British | 18 | 6.94 | 4.036 | 0 | 12 |
|  | French | 17 | 5.53 | 3.412 | 1 | 11 |
|  | Portuguese | 5 | 8.20 | 3.962 | 2 | 12 |
|  | Total | 40 | 6.50 | 3.789 | 0 | 12 |
| Pluralism & Participation | British | 18 | 9.67 | 3.865 | 1 | 15 |
|  | French | 17 | 7.18 | 3.762 | 1 | 15 |
|  | Portuguese | 5 | 10.80 | 4.025 | 5 | 15 |
|  | Total | 40 | 8.75 | 3.998 | 1 | 15 |
| Govt functioning | British | 18 | 6.06 | 3.077 | 0 | 11 |
|  | French | 17 | 4.65 | 2.597 | 1 | 9 |
|  | Portuguese | 5 | 5.80 | 3.701 | 1 | 10 |
|  | Total | 40 | 5.43 | 2.960 | 0 | 11 |
| Free speech | British | 18 | 11.33 | 3.272 | 4 | 15 |
|  | French | 17 | 9.82 | 2.984 | 5 | 15 |
|  | Portuguese | 5 | 12.00 | 3.082 | 8 | 15 |
|  | Total | 40 | 10.78 | 3.166 | 4 | 15 |
| Associational Rights | British | 18 | 7.83 | 3.053 | 2 | 12 |
|  | French | 17 | 6.82 | 2.378 | 3 | 12 |
|  | Portuguese | 5 | 8.40 | 2.074 | 6 | 11 |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | Total | 40 | 7.48 | 2.679 | 2 | 12 |
| Rule of Law | British | 18 | 8.11 | 3.848 | 0 | 13 |
|  | French | 17 | 5.88 | 3.100 | 1 | 12 |
|  | Portuguese | 5 | 8.60 | 4.219 | 4 | 14 |
|  | Total | 40 | 7.23 | 3.690 | 0 | 14 |
| Individual rights | British | 18 | 7.83 | 3.276 | 0 | 12 |
|  | French | 17 | 6.35 | 1.998 | 3 | 10 |
|  | Portuguese | 5 | 8.20 | 3.834 | 3 | 13 |
|  | Total | 40 | 7.25 | 2.907 | 0 | 13 |

Table E.

**Analysis of variance for demand side variables in African countries classified by British/French/Portuguese colonial experience**

| | | Sum of Squares | df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FH Political rights | Between Groups | 12.293 | 2 | 6.146 | 1.854 | .171 |
| | Within Groups | 122.682 | 37 | 3.316 | | |
| | Total | 134.975 | 39 | | | |
| FH Civil liberties | Between Groups | 7.941 | 2 | 3.971 | 2.241 | .121 |
| | Within Groups | 65.559 | 37 | 1.772 | | |
| | Total | 73.500 | 39 | | | |
| Electoral Process | Between Groups | 34.020 | 2 | 17.010 | 1.197 | .314 |
| | Within Groups | 525.980 | 37 | 14.216 | | |
| | Total | 560.000 | 39 | | | |
| Pluralism & Participation | Between Groups | 78.229 | 2 | 39.115 | 2.654 | .084 |
| | Within Groups | 545.271 | 37 | 14.737 | | |
| | Total | 623.500 | 39 | | | |
| Govt functioning | Between Groups | 18.148 | 2 | 9.074 | 1.037 | .364 |
| | Within Groups | 323.627 | 37 | 8.747 | | |
| | Total | 341.775 | 39 | | | |
| Free speech | Between Groups | 28.504 | 2 | 14.252 | 1.455 | .246 |
| | Within Groups | 362.471 | 37 | 9.797 | | |
| | Total | 390.975 | 39 | | | |
| Associational Rights | Between Groups | 13.804 | 2 | 6.902 | .959 | .392 |
| | Within Groups | 266.171 | 37 | 7.194 | | |
| | Total | 279.975 | 39 | | | |
| Rule of Law | Between Groups | 54.233 | 2 | 27.116 | 2.104 | .136 |
| | Within Groups | 476.742 | 37 | 12.885 | | |
| | Total | 530.975 | 39 | | | |
| Individual rights | Between Groups | 24.318 | 2 | 12.159 | 1.474 | .242 |
| | Within Groups | 305.182 | 37 | 8.248 | | |
| | Total | 329.500 | 39 | | | |

Annex 4.
**Literacy as an explanatory variable**

In theory, literacy should offer some hope as a predictor of Voice and Accountability inasmuch as the latter gauges citizen participation through free speech and media. In Figure 13, I have matched the UNDP's literacy measure for 2007 (the latest available) with the Bank's V&A score for the same year. As is clear in the scatterplot, there is virtually no relationship at all, and in fact the $r^2$ measure is only .035. Countries like Mali and Benin with low literacy do as well on V&A as those like Botswana and Namibia with quite high literacy levels. And some with such as Equatorial Guinea and Zimbabwe with the highest literacy levels show up very poorly on V&A.



**Figure 13**
**Literacy and V&A in 2007 and colonial history**

It should be noted that literacy does have a distinct relationship to colonial experience, as becomes apparent in the ANOVA tables below. Former British colonies show an average literacy level of almost 75% and ex-Portuguese states come in at very close to 70%, while the former French colonies are almost 10 points lower at 51%. As a result, the F statistic for the three groups is statistically significant at the .001 level. But as already remarked, neither colonial experience nor literacy can do much to account for Voice and Accountability.

| Colonial regime | N | Mean | Std. Deviation | Minimum | Maximum |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|

| V&A 2007 | British | 16 | -.1169 | .68695 | -1.68 | .86 |
| | French | 16 | -.6680 | .57257 | -1.41 | .36 |
| | Portuguese | 5 | -.1396 | .82702 | -1.14 | .90 |
| | Total | 37 | -.3583 | .69599 | -1.68 | .90 |
| HDI score 2007 | British | 16 | .58063 | .126940 | .365 | .845 |
| | French | 16 | .48456 | .106206 | .340 | .755 |
| | Portuguese | 5 | .54420 | .142138 | .396 | .708 |
| | Total | 37 | .53416 | .125402 | .340 | .845 |
| UNDP Literacy % 2007 | British | 16 | 74.94 | 13.213 | 38 | 92 |
| | French | 16 | 50.94 | 20.025 | 26 | 86 |
| | Portuguese | 5 | 69.60 | 17.530 | 44 | 88 |
| | Total | 37 | 63.84 | 20.182 | 26 | 92 |

**ANOVA**

| | | Sum of Squares | df | Mean Square | F | Sig. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V&A 2007 | Between Groups | 2.706 | 2 | 1.353 | 3.123 | .057 |
| | Within Groups | 14.732 | 34 | .433 | | |
| | Total | 17.438 | 36 | | | |
| HDI score 2007 | Between Groups | .074 | 2 | .037 | 2.572 | .091 |
| | Within Groups | .492 | 34 | .014 | | |
| | Total | .566 | 36 | | | |
| UNDP Literacy % 2007 | Between Groups | 4799.952 | 2 | 2399.976 | 8.273 | .001 |
| | Within Groups | 9863.075 | 34 | 290.090 | | |
| | Total | 14663.027 | 36 | | | |

# Demand side governance in the Africa region – Moving forward
## Annex on levels of significance in assessing change over time

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In comparing Voice and Accountability measures at different points in time, it is important to look at confidence levels. Even when there seems to be a substantial shift in a country's V&A index over time, if we cannot be very confident about the accuracy of the two measures involved, it follows that we cannot be very sure that the apparent variation between them portrays a real difference. As the WGI has grown in coverage and sophistication over the years, the degree of statistical confidence in its measures has markedly increased, but considerable uncertainly none-theless remains. This short note aims to explore the issue of confidence levels and their implications for the validity of the findings in my previous paper on demand side governance in the Africa region (Blair 2010).

A 90 percent confidence level would mean that we could be sure that nine times out of ten the apparent difference between V&A measures in two distinct years reflects a true underlying difference. The way to determine this is to take a 90% confidence interval around each of the point estimates and see if they overlap; if they do not, we can conclude there is a 90% probability that the two measures are in fact different. As the authors of the "Governance Matters" series have observed, however, "[t]he 90 percent confidence level is quite high, and for some purposes a lower confidence level, say 75 percent, would be appropriate for identifying changes in governance that are likely to be practically important." They found that on average only 9% of the countries included in their global survey of six indicators showed changes at the 90% confidence level, but that 21% experienced a change at the 75% level.[24] In the present note, I will look at both the 90% and 75% levels.

The starting point for our analysis is Figure A, which is taken from my original essay (Blair 2010: Figure 8).[25] Almost all the 48 countries appearing in the scattergram evidenced some change in V&A over the 1996-2008 period, which is to say that almost all the small circles representing them show up at some distance from the 45° line indicating no change (a few countries like Somalia at the lower end and Mauritius at the upper end appear virtually on the line). The question here is how many countries are far enough from the 45° no-change line that we could say there's a 90% probability that they really are not on it? And how many would pass a similar test at a 75% level?

A further question comes with Figure B, which divided the countries of Figure A into "cluster types" according to how much V&A progress or decline they had experienced over the years from 1996 to 2008. What would be left of these clusters if only countries meeting the 90% or 75% test were to be considered?

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[24] Kaufmann et al.(2009: 19). The same formulation is also found in other reports from the Kaufmann team (e.g., Kaufmann et al. 2008: 20).

[25] Table 3 provides country identifications for the 3-letter codes used in my figures.

Over the years of the WGI surveys, the number of sources used has increased and the estimates have tightened significantly, as indicated in Table 1. In the first WGI study, based on the year 1996, the number of sources used per country averaged just under three (2.96), and the standard error averaged 0.26. By 2008, the WGI methodology had improved the point that sources had more than quadrupled to a bit over 12 per country and the standard error had decreased by half to an average of 0.13. But as this 0.13 level indicates, even the improved accuracy of the later assessments includes a good deal of uncertainty.

What this means in terms of confidence levels for differences across time can be illustrated with an example, as shown in Table 2. Tanzania had 4 sources for the WGI in 1996, which established a point estimate of -0.65 on the V&A scale with a standard error of 0.23, which in turn translated into a 90% confidence band that stretched between a low of -1.03 and a high of -0.26 around the -0.65 point estimate. In 2008, the V&A indicator had improved substantially, such that the point estimate had become -0.09, while the standard error had dropped to 0.13, which meant tighter confidence bands. But the upper 90% level of 1996 was -.026 while the lower 90% level for 2008 was -0.30, so that they overlapped (between -0.26 and -0.30), meaning that we could not be 90% confident that the two point estimates were in fact different. At the 75% level, however, there was considerable space between the 1996 high of -0.38 and the 2008 low of -0.24, so at that level we can say the two point estimates are really different.

It is now time to take up my first two questions about how many African countries will pass the 90% and 75% confidence thresholds. Figure C repeats Figure A, with those cases meeting the two confidence levels indicated by ovals (for 90%) and diamonds (for 75%). Altogether 9 countries make the 90% cutoff, while an additional 9, like Tanzania in the example above, get to the 75% level, making a total of 18. Africa thus compares favorably with the finding noted by Kaufmann et al. (2009: 18). Whereas they found only 9% of their countries on average showed showed changes over time at the 90% confidence level for any given indicator and 21% at the 75% level, here we find almost 20% (9/48) at the 90% mark and three-eighths (3.5% or 18/48) at the 75% level. We thus have a considerably richer catch than the WGI average; another way to put it is that the Africa region is more volatile than most other regions, at least for the V&A measure, in that more countries are moving further up and down on this scale.

In order to show a bit more clarity, Figure D eliminates all countries from Figure C that did not make at least the 75% level. There are 10 that showed improvement (are above the 45$^o$ line), and 8 that experienced decline (below the line) over the timeframe. Six of the improvers pass the 90% test and three the 75% level. Among the decliners are three at 90% and five at 75%.

To answer my final question about cluster types, the cluster ovals used in Figure B are superimposed on Figure D to make Figure E1. What it portrays constitute what were the most interesting cases from the original exercise, i.e., those that showed the most change over the 1996-2008 period. The countries that formed clusters I ("Good and improving"), II ("Earlier progress stalled"), and VII ("Continuing bad performers") have largely dropped out, leaving all those in clusters III ("Good recent progress"), V ("Bad cases improving") and VI ("Rapid decliners"), along with one lone case from cluster II.

Figure E2 renumbers the clusters, so that it can be used by itself without reference to the earlier exercise.

A similar pattern appears in Figure F, which is directly reproduced from my earlier paper. Here it will be seen that the countries with the largest residuals from the regression are with several exceptions the same ones now populating our three main clusters. The first 8 countries on the left are part of our 75% and 90% populations in Figure E showing improved V&A indicators, and the first 7 on the right are part of our decliners at these same confidence levels. This is scarcely surprising because these countries are also those the furthest away from the 45$^\circ$ line in Figure E.

 In a word, the countries that were most interesting in the original exercise remain the most interesting after the whole group of countries has been filtered through a statistical confidence-testing process. The central analytical task continues to be to figure out why the countries in clusters III and V made such good progress and why those in cluster VI declined so rapidly.

SOME CAVEATS

Any analysis of the present sort is of course in large part a function of the data employed. Here I used the same data set as I had in the initial paper: the WGI dataset produced in 2009 based on the year 2008. In September 2010, the WGI team released its indicators for the 2009 year, which reflected changes that had taken place over the previous year. My purpose in undertaking this follow-up exercise was to ascertain the validity of the data used in the earlier one, so I used the same database, but if I had used the 2010 dataset instead, I would not have had to change much. Angola and Zambia would no longer have passed the 75% threshold, Congo would have dropped from 90% to 75%, and Mali would have emerged into the 75% class. The first two had improved in V&A terms sufficiently to change their position, while the last two had dropped far enough to do so. Time-based differences among the other 15 countries would have remained at the same level of confidence.[26]

One last concern relates to the years chosen to make comparisons across time. If I had chosen 2002 for my base year, the average number of sources per country would have been 6 rather than 3, and the standard error would have declined from 0.26 to 0.20. Some countries that failed to attain 75% confidence levels with the 1996 figures might have done so with the smaller standard error listed for 2002. But then the timeframe would have decreased from 12 years to 6, offering only half the time for any V&A changes to have taken place. Given this tradeoff, the longer time period and larger standard error are to be preferred.

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[26] A less obvious set of changes comes each year as the datasets for the previous years are modified to reflect new data sources introduced to the database. For the countries used in the present paper, the 2010 changes were too small to have any impact on the years 1996 and 2008. See Kaufmann et al. (2010: 6).

**Table 1.  Voice and Accountability for Africa region from WGI database, 1996 to 2009**

| Year | Number of sources average | Point estimate average | Standard error average |
|------|------|------|------|
| 1996 | 2.96 | -0.56 | 0.26 |
| 1998 | 3.85 | -0.71 | 0.26 |
| 2000 | 3.98 | -0.68 | 0.26 |
| 2002 | 6.04 | -0.65 | 0.20 |
| 2003 | 6.67 | -0.63 | 0.19 |
| 2004 | 7.88 | -0.64 | 0.20 |
| 2005 | 8.21 | -0.65 | 0.19 |
| 2006 | 10.48 | -0.58 | 0.17 |
| 2007 | 10.85 | -0.58 | 0.14 |
| 2008 | 12.13 | -0.58 | 0.13 |
| 2009 | 12.69 | -0.63 | 0.13 |

**Table 2. Tanzania Voice & Accountability index, 1996 and 2008**

|  | Number of sources | Point estimate | Standard error | 90% low level | 90% high level | 75% low level | 75% high level |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1996 | 4 | -0.65 | 0.23 | -1.03 | -0.26 | -0.92 | -0.38 |
| 2008 | 15 | -0.09 | 0.13 | -0.30 | 0.12 | -0.24 | 0.06 |

Table 3.

# Africa country codes for Governance Matters data

| Code | Country | Code | Country | Code | Country |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AGO | ANGOLA | GIN | GUINEA | RWA | RWANDA |
| BDI | BURUNDI | GMB | GAMBIA | SDN | SUDAN |
| BEN | BENIN | GNB | GUINEA-BISSAU | SEN | SENEGAL |
| BFA | BURKINA FASO | GNQ | EQUAT GUINEA | SLE | SIERRA LEONE |
| BWA | BOTSWANA | KEN | KENYA | SOM | SOMALIA |
| CAF | CENT AFR REP | LBR | LIBERIA | STP | STOME & PRINCIP |
| CIV | COTE D'IVOIRE | LSO | LESOTHO | SWZ | SWAZILAND |
| CMR | CAMEROON | MDG | MADAGASCAR | SYC | SEYCHELLES |
| COG | CONGO | MLI | MALI | TCD | CHAD |
| COM | COMOROS | MOZ | MOZAMBIQUE | TGO | TOGO |
| CPV | CAPE VERDE | MRT | MAURITANIA | TZA | TANZANIA |
| DJI | DJIBOUTI | MUS | MAURITIUS | UGA | UGANDA |
| ERI | ERITREA | MWI | MALAWI | ZAF | SOUTH AFRICA |
| ETH | ETHIOPIA | NAM | NAMIBIA | ZAR | DEM REP CONGO |
| GAB | GABON | NER | NIGER | ZMB | ZAMBIA |
| GHA | GHANA | NGA | NIGERIA | ZWE | ZIMBABWE |

**Figure A.   Voice & Accountability in the Africa region, 1996 & 2008**



**Figure B.  V&A changes 1996-2008:  Cluster types**



**Cluster types**

| I | Good and improving |
|---|---|
| II | Earlier progress stalled |
| III | Good recent progress |
| IV | Little traction |
| V | Bad cases improving |
| VI | Rapid decliners |
| VII | Continuing bad performers |

R<sup>2</sup> Linear = 0.651

**Figure C.  V&A changes 1996-2008: Confidence levels at 75% and 90%**



**Figure D.  V&A changes 1996-2008: Countries at 75% and 90% only**

**Figure E1.  V&A changes 1996-2008: 75% & 90% country cluster types**



**Figure E2.  V&A changes 1996-2008: 75% & 90% country cluster types**

**Figure F.  V&A residual analysis**



Voice & Accountability 2008: Unstandardized residuals from regression on V&A1996

The bars indicate the extent to which actual values for V&A 2008 differ from what a regression on V&A 1996 would predict. For NGA (Nigeria) the predicted value was − 1.66 but the actual value was − 0.50, a difference of +0.96, which is the value shown by the leftmost bar. Liberia made the nextmost progress (+0.92), followed by Ghana (+0.84), Burundi (+0.69) and Kenya (+0.63).

On the negative side, Eritrea fell the furthest (− 1.20) below predicted value, followed by Zimbabwe (− 0.89). For many other states, the V&A1996 reading served as quite an exact predictor of their 2008 positions. Sudan, Somalia and DRC improved scarcely at all from their dismal 1996 showings, while South Africa, Botswana, Mali and Benin maintained the relatively good track records they had set in the earlier year.

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