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Civil Society Advocacy in Bangladesh and the Philippines: A Comparative Exploration with the Tsukuba Surveys

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Civil society is widely perceived to be flourishing in Bangladesh and the Philippines, both in its size and in its overall impact on society. At the same time, these two civil societies are seen to be oriented in quite divergent directions with very different consequences. While civil society in the Philippines is seen as especially active in its advocacy on public policy issues (Silliman and Noble, 1998; Blair 2001), its Bangladeshi counterpart is viewed as relatively reticent in the public square, pursuing its service delivery goals with enviable skill and dedication but refraining from any serious advocacy with the state (Lewis, 2011; Wood 1997). How might these differences manifest themselves in what civil society organizations (CSOs) do?

Tsukuba University's surveys of civil society organizations, undertaken in these two countries during the mid-2000s decade (the Japanese Interest Group Survey (JIGS)), offer a unique opportunity to explore such a question. Thus far several reports based on the datasets have appeared, concentrating on Bangladesh or the Philippines (Tasnim and Ahmed in this volume; Shuto et al., 2008), but to my knowledge no comparative studies involving any of the JIGS countries have yet emerged into circulation beyond the Tsukuba center. In this chapter I will employ the JIGS datasets from Bangladesh and the Philippines to take a preliminary look at—whether and if so—to what extent Philippine CSOs are more involved in advocacy than those in Bangladesh. The chapter thus constitutes an early reconnaissance mission rather than a thorough analysis of the data at hand. My hope is that this exploration will encourage others to take up similar comparative studies using the rich JIGS datasets now available for some 14 countries (soon to be 15, with several countries included in a second round of surveys).

The chapter will begin with a brief comparative account of the two surveys and datasets themselves, in order to provide context for the analysis. A second section will lay out the political backdrop within which civil society functioned during the mid-2000s, and then a third section will present a typology of civil society organizations included in the survey, concentrating on the degree to which they can be compared. The following section explores issues of political influence, advocacy, and success in achieving policy changes. The fifth section finds that this initial and tentative exercise has found some differences in CSO advocacy between the two countries, but that such differences are not as great as initially anticipated. A final section concludes the analysis and offers suggestions for future analysis using the JIGS datasets. In the

present essay, I have only scratched the surface of what queries might be explored in comparing the countries surveyed by the Tsukuba center thus far.

The Surveys and Datasets

The Philippine survey was conducted during February–May 2005, followed by the Bangladesh survey in September 2006–January 2007. Both surveys began with lists of CSOs already collected by various in-country agencies. In the Philippines two such collections sufficed, while in Bangladesh some seven sources were used. The areas in both countries consisted of the capital metropolitan area and one large regional city. In the Philippines, this meant metro Manila (population 11.5 million in 2007) and Cebu (2.5 million), the second largest city in the country and main urban node for the Visayas region in the nation’s central area. For Bangladesh, the survey areas consisted of the Dhaka Metro region (14.6 million in 2008) and Rajshahi (2.7 million), the fourth largest city and principal urban center for the country’s northwestern region.

In both countries, comprehensive random sample frames were developed from the available CSO listings to include the various categories of CSOs such as trade unions, business groups, professional organizations, and so on. Employing direct face-to-face interviews with the CSOs selected, the Philippines team was able to complete 1,014 cases, which amounted to 18.5 percent of the total sampling frame. For Bangladesh, the figures were 1,509 cases and a 25.5 percent turnout. Response rates for the larger and smaller cities, though, were more similar than a countrywide comparison suggests. In Metro Manila and Dhaka Metro, 16.8 percent and 21.4 percent respectively responded, while in Cebu and Rajshahi, the rates were 42.4 percent and 41.1 percent.

Probing further, the success rates proved quite varied among the different CSO types, as is evident from Table 7.1 for Bangladesh.¹ The total CSO population consisted of the organizations listed on the books of the various agencies consulted, such as the NGO Affairs Bureau or the Dhaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Some of these data sets were more current than others. Perhaps more importantly, various CSOs of different types had quite divergent incentives for getting themselves listed; social welfare CSOs likely wanted to get registered in hopes of receiving state funds, but labor unions might have feared that registration would put them at risk of harassment from employers and also the state. Thus whereas social welfare CSOs amounted to 10.3 percent of the target population, they comprised 21.2 percent of the interviewed population, and on the contrary labor unions constituted 15.5 percent of the target bodies but only 6.1 percent of the interviewed groups. Accordingly, the data sets cannot be considered to be statistically

¹ Data in this paragraph and Table 7.1 were derived from BD-JIGS Codebook (2009: iii-x). Similar data were not available for the Philippines.

representative of the CSO populations in the two areas selected. But given the difficulties inherent in determining the whole universe of CSOs to begin with, compounded by the problems encountered in finding those that could be initially identified (inevitably many, especially smaller ones, would have opened, closed, or changed their addresses since listings had been compiled), the two country samples are as good as could possibly be expected, short of a hugely costly field exercise that no donor agency or foundation would be willing to sponsor.

The datasets themselves are by design as similar as possible across the two countries. Some questions necessarily had to be adapted to country context, such as those concerning particular political parties or recent political events, but the vast majority are virtually identical, thereby enabling me to undertake the comparisons that form the basis for the present chapter. The division of each country sample between two urban areas invites in-country comparisons between larger and smaller cities in each, but in order to maximize the number of cases in each comparison, I have employed the entire national dataset, keeping in mind that my comparisons are between CSO samples in a couple of major urban areas in Bangladesh and the Philippines, not between the general CSO populations in the two countries. For Bangladesh this means 1,005 responding CSOs in Dhaka and 504 in Rajshahi for a total of 1,509, while in the Philippines there are 855 in Metro Manila and 159 in Cebu for a total of 1,014.² Given that virtually all of the main CSOs throughout the world operate from organizational headquarters in the capital or some other very large urban setting, this is probably a reasonable approach to take.

The Political Backdrop

Some introduction would be useful to connect the two surveys to the political environment in place when the Philippines survey was conducted during February–May 2005, followed by the Bangladesh survey during September 2006 for Rajshahi and December 2006–January 2007 for Dhaka. The general climate for civil society can be gauged from three indices. First, the Freedom House scores for Political Rights and Civil Liberties³, which have after their beginning in 1972 become more or less the industry standard within the international development community, are shown in Figure 7.1 for the decade preceding the surveys and years since. Figure 7.1 portrays the combined scores for these two indices, each of which ranges from one (best) to

² In the Philippines the same questionnaire was employed for both sites. In Bangladesh, however, the schedule used in Rajshahi differed on some questions from the Dhaka version, so in this chapter I will use only those questions that were asked in both locations.

³ In the Freedom House calculus, “Political Rights ratings are based on an evaluation of three subcategories: electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government. Civil Liberties ratings are based on an evaluation of four subcategories: freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights” (Puddington, 2011: 30).

seven (worst) meaning total scores between two and 14; Freedom House reckons that combined scores between two and five to indicate that a political system is “free” while those between six and 10 show a “partly free” status. For almost all the years leading up to the Philippines survey in 2005, through the presidencies of Fidel Ramos (1992–1998), Joseph Estrada (1998–2001) and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (beginning in 2001) the Freedom House measure held quite steady at five, sagging by a point to six in the survey year itself (thus slipping into “partly free” territory). Bangladesh began the period at six under the Awami League (AL) as the ruling party (1996–2001), dropping to seven in 1999, then with the rival Bangladesh National Party (BNP) in charge (2001–2006), decreasing to eight in 2002 and to nine in 2007 as a military-backed regime took over managing the country. The JIGS surveys thus took place in both countries at a time of declining democratic practice.

Table 7.1 Bangladesh: Target population, sample frame, and actual respondent CSOs

CSO category	Target population				Sample frame				Actually interviewed				Success rate %
	Dhaka	Rajshahi	Total	%	Dhaka	Rajshahi	Total	%	Dhaka	Rajshahi	Total	%	
Cooperatives	6398	2540	8938	30.3	1280	838	2118	35.8	250	193	443	29.	5.0
Youth & cultural	1783	108	1891	6.4	214	33	247	4.2	157	13	170	11.3	9.0
Mosque	1985		1985	6.7	596		596	10.1	155		155	10.3	7.8
NGO	4153	129	4282	14.5	498	35	533	9.0	134	22	156	10.4	3.6
Chamber & trade	4200	45	4245	14.4	840	6	846	14.3	104	6	110	7.3	2.6
Labor union	4488	99	4587	15.5	898	32	930	15.7	83	9	92	6.1	2.0
Social welfare	2263	793	3056	10.3	272	260	532	9.0	77	243	320	21.2	10.5
Education / research	317	33	350	1.2	38	12	50	0.8	26	9	35	2.3	10.0
Professional body	173	21	194	0.7	52	11	63	1.1	19	6	25	1.7	12.9
Total	25760	3768	29528	100.0	4688	1227	5 915	100.0	1005	501	1506	100.0	5.1

Note: "Success rate" = number actually interviewed as percentage of target population.

Source of data: BD-JIGS

A second, more recent effort and one that focuses more closely on civil society is the Voice and Accountability (V&A) index published by the World Bank beginning in 1996; at first biannually and since 2002 as an annual offering, as shown in Figure 7.2.⁴ Here scores for the two countries are shown in terms of statistical standard deviations from the worldwide mean for each year. The Philippines began slightly above the world average in 1996 (at the 57th percentile) but by the JIGS survey in 2005 had declined to just below that average (48th percentile), while Bangladesh fell from the 47th percentile in 1996 to the 33rd by 2006 and down a bit further to the 32nd the following year. As can be observed in Figure 7.2, the Philippines saw a steady weakening in the V&A measure from 1998 onward up through the 2005 JIGS survey, and while Bangladesh had dropped more steeply during 1996–2004, it improved in the next two years but was in the process of falling again in 2007 as the military-backed government took shape. To sum up, in the World Bank’s accounting, the Philippine V&A was continuing to deteriorate at the time of the JGIS survey, and in Bangladesh, where V&A had always been considerably lower, it had begun to sag again when the survey was taken.

⁴ Using some 30 sources, the Bank’s Voice and Accountability index endeavors to capture “perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media” (World Bank, 2011).

Table 7.2. Self-classified organizational types

Type	Bangladesh			Philippines					Total	
	n	%	Median size	n	%	Reduced set			n	%
						N	%	Median		
TOP GROUP CSOs										
Business/economic	259	17.2	150	40	4.0	32	4.2	50	299	11.9
Education/research	53	3.5	62	66	6.6	43	5.6	105	119	4.7
Social welfare	493	32.8	90	73	7.3	55	7.2	100	566	22.5
NGO (including PO for Philippines)	106	7.0	288	263	26.1	184	24.0	103	369	14.7
Religious				151	15.0	118	15.4	75	151	6.0
Religious Islamic	138	9.2	200						138	5.5
Professional	45	3.0	182	44	4.4	33	4.3	150	89	3.5
Subtotal Top Groups	1094	72.7		637	63.3	465	60.5		1731	68.9
SMALLER BUT COMPARABLE CSO GROUPS										
Agriculture	96	6.4	30	12	1.2	10	1.3	5	108	4.3
Labor	96	6.4	230	10	1.0	8	1.0	44	106	4.2
Cultural	83	5.5	50	5	0.5	5	0.7	120	88	3.5
Govt-related	3	0.2	64	17	1.7	11	1.4	102	20	0.8
Recreational (sports)	66	4.4	50	22	2.2	20	2.6	55	88	3.5
Subtotal smaller groups	344	22.9		66	6.6	54	7.0		410	16.3
Total comparable groups	1438	95.6		703	69.9	519	67.6		2141	85.2
NON-COMPARABLE CSO GROUPS										
Religious non-Islamic (Bangladesh)	13	0.9	15						15	0.6
Philanthropy				8	0.8	7	0.9	25	8	0.3
Public affairs				10	1.0	5	0.7	106	10	0.4
Citizens	30	2.0	118						30	1.2
International				2	0.2	2	0.3	2002	2	0.1
Other groups unspecified	23	1.5	150	276	27.4	235	30.6	90	299	11.9
Not classified				7	0.7		0.0		7	0.3

Total non-comparable groups	66	4.4		303	30.1	249	32.4		371	14.8
Grand total	1504	100.0	100	1006	100.0	768	100.0	90	2512	100.0

Note: median figures could not be calculated for all Philippine CSOs; for a reduced set (shown here in *italics*), it was possible to calculate median data. The totals shown in the rightmost two columns include the entire CSO population for both countries. Source of data: BD-JIGS and PH-JIGS

As a third measure, media freedom, which is generally considered a component of civil society, is perhaps the best overall indicator of a country's state of democratic governance, for without it citizens cannot find out what is happening in the polity and thus cannot begin to hold the state accountable in any significant way. Since 2001, Freedom House has been compiling a media freedom score, shown for our two countries in Figure 7.3. The ratings vary between zero (best) and 100 (worst). As with Political Rights and Civil Liberties in Figure 7.1 and V&A in Figure 7.2, so here also the Philippines did better than Bangladesh across the years under review, though here we see the former deteriorating at a modest but steady rate in the years leading up to the JGIS survey, while Bangladesh remained essentially at the same lower level throughout the period, though it improved after 2007.

**Table 7.3 Receiving foreign assistance:
NGOs in Bangladesh vs NGOs Plus POs in the Philippines**

		Bangladesh	Philippines	Total
Does organization receive assistance from outside sources?	Yes	86	72	158
	No	20	187	207
	Total	106	259	365

Note: Yule's Q = .836

Source of data: BD-JIGS and PH-JIGS

Putting together these three comparative indices, we can conclude that the Philippines has been ahead of Bangladesh on measures of general democracy (Figure 7.1 from Freedom House), Voice and Accountability (Figure 7.2 from the World Bank), and in particular the media (Figure 7.3, again from Freedom House). But most of these indices showed some decline in both countries, especially in the period immediately before the JIGS surveys were conducted. To the extent that these democracy scoring enterprises accurately reflected conditions on the ground, then, it should be expected that the CSOs interviewed would be at least somewhat cautious about

the prospects for civil society advocacy. Had the JIGS surveys been conducted several years later, say around 2009 or 2010 when all the indicators in Figures 7.1–7.3 were going up, we could anticipate that respondents would have been a bit more upbeat.

The Philippine survey during February–May 2005 took place during the first year after the national election of May 2004, which returned President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to office. The coalition of parties aligned with her, the *Koalisyon ng Katapatan sa Kinabukasan* (known as K4), won 176 of the total 206 seats in the House of Representatives for a very solid majority, along with seven of the 12 Senate seats at stake thus solidifying Arroyo’s majority in that body. As the principal opposition coalition, the *Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino* (KNP) came close on the presidential vote (taking 36.5 percent as against 40.0 percent for the K4 coalition), but losing badly in the House (only 22 seats) and the Senate (5 seats). The election was marred by accusations of fraud, however, which continued to resonate for a long while afterward. A nationwide survey conducted in August 2004 by Social Weather Stations, the most respected polling firm in the country, showed 55 percent of respondents believing that the KNP presidential candidate was cheated out of electoral victory, and during the winter and spring of 2005 an impeachment movement against President Arroyo was gathering strength. It was in short a time of serious popular discontent with the basic political process in the Philippines when the Tsukuba Cross-National Survey was conducted during the February–May period.⁵

The Bangladesh survey was conducted in Rajshahi during September 2006 and then in Dhaka during December 2006–January 2007, a time of even more uncertainty in the country than existed in the Philippines when the JIGS survey was undertaken there. The run-up to national elections scheduled to take place in January 2007 had been severely compromised by indications that the incumbent majority party was manipulating the process to ensure its victory amid increasing acrimony between the two major parties in a system that had long been dysfunctional at best. In December the opposition party, the Awami League, announced that it would boycott the election altogether, throwing the election scene into turmoil, and in January, only a few days before the scheduled voting, the military backed a civilian-led coup that established a quasi-martial law in the country for the next 23 months (Blair, 2010). The survey thus took place during a period of extreme stress for the polity.

The political parties themselves also need a bit of explanation, as they comprise very different political systems in the two countries. During its first decades of independence, the Philippines had a fairly stable two-party system that regularly alternated in power, but after the

⁵ See Rivera (2005) and Hedman (2006) for a summary analysis of the political atmosphere in the Philippines during this time. The impeachment movement failed in the end, but in the process it was revealed that President Arroyo had pressured the national Commission on Elections to report a favorable vote for her (Hedman, 2006: 188), thus lending much credence to allegations of electoral fraud. For a longer view of the period, see Hutchcroft (2008).

Marcos dictatorship (1972–1986) and the democratic restoration of 1986, parties became highly unstable and in many ways essentially opportunistic personality cults, rising and fading, coalescing and fragmenting as factions shifted ground. Of the 12 parties that won House seats in 2004, for instance, only eight did so for the following election in 2010, along with eight new parties; and the two major 2004 coalitions that between them had won 198 of 209 or 95 percent of all House seats had by 2010 split up and reformed into five new competing coalitions each of which won at least 9 percent of the seats. In a word, stability, loyalty and dependability have not been among the strengths of the country’s political party system.⁶

By contrast, the two major political parties in Bangladesh have as such been models of stability with longstanding leadership, a well-honed chain of command, and regular alternation in power since the reintroduction of democracy in 1991, although over these same years they have produced a highly unstable and dysfunctional political system characterized by corruption and political patronage. The two party leaders, Khalida Zia of the Bangladesh National Party (which was in power up through late 2006) and Sheikh Hasina Wajed of the Awami League were respectively the widow and daughter of assassinated presidents and have nurtured the organizations they inherited in a mutually hostile relationship. Since 1991 the two parties have alternated in power, each time with the ruling party shutting out the losing party from any significant role in governance, while the opposition party has responded by boycotting the Parliament and disrupting the economy with massive demonstrations and strikes shutting down the economy for days at a time. Consequently, Bangladeshi political life had been precarious for some 15 years before the JIGS survey but was especially so at the very time the survey was conducted. It would have been surprising if respondents reported great faith in either political parties or the political system itself when the surveys were taken.

Regarding civil society more generally, there are also deeper pathologies in both countries that need at least a brief review.⁷ Since colonial times, politics at all levels in the Philippines has been heavily influenced and even dominated by local bosses and oligarchs managing society through a patrimonial politics that has carried over largely intact into the current era, a process summed up in Benedict Anderson’s widely cited phrase “cacique democracy” (Anderson, 1988; Hutchcroft, 1991; Quimpo, 2008; Timberman, 1991. And Bangladesh politics continues to be characterized more by patronage-based linkages than by ideologies, issues, or constituency demands (Lewis, 2011; Blair, 2010) Even so, civil society advocacy has had a notable presence in both countries, as tidal movements (the Marcos and Estrada ousters in the Philippines and the

⁶ The data in this paragraph have been extracted from “Politics of the Philippines” and “Philippine General Election, 2004,” both in Wikipedia.

⁷ I am grateful to Nathan Gilbert Quimpo for reminding me of this in his comments at the Bangladesh civil society workshop in Tsukuba in February 2012.

Ershad overthrow in Bangladesh) and issue-based advocacy at various levels, including fishery delimitation laws in the Philippines and polybag abolition in Bangladesh (Blair, 2004; Lewis, 2011).

To sum up, the political context of both systems at the time of their JIGS surveys showed a combination of decline and stagnation by several standard measures of democratization, and both countries were undergoing particular political crises at that moment. Given that similar patterns were playing out in both places, then, we might say that at least to a degree a set of what could be called “natural controls” were in place, that is, differences in CSO advocacy could not be attributed to declining democratization or political crises, because similar developments were unfolding in both settings.⁸ But because (1) the Philippine trajectories in all three measures were consistently higher than those for Bangladesh, and (2) much of the prevailing wisdom asserts a significantly greater level of civil society advocacy in the Philippines than in Bangladesh, the JIGS datasets offer an excellent opportunity to test the hypothesis that advocacy is more (or perhaps much more) prevalent in the Philippines. My research objective in this essay is to see whether and how far the JIGS data confirm or refute this expectation.

Taxonomies of Civil Society Organizations

Whereas Table 7.1 categorized CSOs by how they were identified from various exogenous sources, Table 7.2 provides a classification according to how they identified themselves in terms of their main interest. Several aspects of this taxonomy stand out. First, the great majority of the CSOs fit into types found in both countries. If we include groups affiliated with the locally dominant religion (Islam in Bangladesh and Christianity in the Philippines⁹), the comparable total comprises 95.6 percent of Bangladesh groups and 69.9 percent of those in the Philippines. This number still excludes some 30 percent of the CSOs interviewed in the Philippines, however, mainly because 276 of the total 1,006 Philippine CSOs identified their main interest as something “other” than the 16 named categories offered in the questionnaire.¹⁰

⁸ My assertion here assumes the declines and crises were of essentially equivalent magnitude in both countries, a statement which of course cannot be proven, whence the caveat “at least to a degree” is inserted above.

⁹ The Bangladesh survey distinguished between Islamic religious organizations (n=138) and non-Islamic religious groups (n=15). The Philippine inquiry did not do so, but in the two areas surveyed, Christianity is overwhelmingly the dominant religion, so while a few non-Christian organizations were no doubt included, it should be safe to assume that almost all of the 151 groups self-identifying themselves as primarily religious were Christian.

¹⁰ A look through these “other” answers shows 166 fitting into three identifiable types: organizations centering on homeowner (56), neighborhood (66), or transportation (44) interests. The remaining 110 “other” groups had widely scattered interests. The three larger groups could

A second finding is that all these CSOs were not equally represented in the two countries. For example, the 96 agricultural groups in Bangladesh amounted to 6.4 percent of the total NGOs interviewed, while in the Philippines they were only 12, or 1.2 percent of the sample—far too small to permit any serious analysis of agricultural CSOs. In fact, only six of the organizational types (indicated by boldface in Table 7.2) provide enough cases in each of the two countries for such scrutiny—Business/economic, Education/research, Social welfare, NGOs, Professionals and religious groups affiliated with the dominant religion. These six I have labeled as “Top Groups” in the upper part of Table 7.2. Some types were fairly prominent in Bangladesh but sparse in Philippines (Agriculture, Labor), while a few showed up at least modestly in one country but not at all in the other (Citizens, Philanthropy, Public Affairs)

Thirdly, most of the organizations are quite small. The median membership size for all CSOs in Bangladesh was only 100, and only three types had medians of 200 or more in their memberships (NGOs, Labor unions, and Islamic religious groups). The five largest reported memberships were all for NGOs, with the topmost being nine million, followed by two of 1.3–1.5 million, but then size dropped off rapidly, and the 752nd one (that is, the median) reported only 100 members.

Comparable data for the Philippines are somewhat harder to pin down, and the sample required some modification to be usable. Some 238 CSOs had to be eliminated, most likely because of a coding error,¹¹ but the 768 remaining organizations show essentially the same pattern as the 1,006 in the full sample, as can be confirmed by comparing figures in the “%” column and the “Reduced set /%” column of Table 7.2. More importantly, the organizations of most interest to us (Top Group CSOs of Table 7.2 in boldface) are very roughly the same size as those in Bangladesh, except for NGOs and religious groups, where the Bangladeshi organizations have on average more than twice as many members as those in the Philippines.

The number of full-time employees provides another convenient indicator of organizational strength.¹² Here also, the median figures were very modest. In Bangladesh, the median employee number for NGOs was 15.5, but in second place were Business groups and Islamic organizations at only 3.0 each. Social welfare bodies showed a median figure of exactly

have been included as such in the dataset, but even if they had been, there were no corresponding categories for Bangladesh and thus no comparisons possible in the present exercise.

¹¹ Almost all of the eliminated CSOs consisted of organizations recorded as having 99 as the number of individual members—a most unlikely figure which probably means that this commonly used code for “Don’t Know/No Answer” got included as an actual answer. So I treated this coding as “Missing data” and eliminated these CSOs here in Table 2. In most of the paper, however, membership size is not a relevant factor, so I have included these CSOs.

¹² I have not included a table for number of employees.

one full-time employee. Part-time employees were even fewer, with the median in all cases being zero, indicating that at least half the Bangladeshi CSOs had no part-time employees. Could voluntary workers be taking up the slack? There were more of them, with the total CSO population showing a median of six, as opposed to the median of one for full-time employees and zero for part-time workers. Still, the number is rather small.

In terms of full-time employees, Philippine CSOs are even more poorly staffed than those in Bangladesh, with a median for the whole sample at zero (vs one for Bangladesh). For the larger organizations of most interest to us (top of Table 7.2), Business CSOs and those in Education as well as Social welfare all had a median of 1 employee in Bangladesh as against zero in the Philippines, while religious organizations were two and one, and finally the NGO category showed a major difference with medians of 15.5 and zero in the two countries. Part-time employees were hard to find in either country, with almost all types of organizations displaying medians of zero. And finally, the Philippine questionnaire did not include any data on volunteer workers, so no comparisons are possible.

Organizational budgets offer a further opportunity for comparison, perhaps to be taken up in a future exercise. As a caveat, however, it is worth noting that data here are both elusive and more likely to be inaccurate even when provided. In the Bangladesh survey, fully 443 of the 1,509—almost 30 percent—CSOs interviewed declined to furnish any data at all about their budgets, as against only three not giving member data and no organizations withholding employee figures. Philippine CSOs displayed even more reluctance on budgets, with 443 of 1,014 (just under 44 percent) declining to give an answer (compared with 22 percent on members and 10 percent on employees). In addition there are serious questions about accuracy in many CSO budgets, for at least two reasons. First, they often have concerns about tax liabilities. Second, those receiving foreign funds have to face donor stipulations on program vs operational costs. Most donors impose unrealistic ceilings on what proportion of their funds may be spent on the latter, forcing recipient CSOs to engage in various kinds of creative bookkeeping. In short, CSO budget figures have to be used with considerable caution. To be sure, membership rolls can be inflated to improve an organization's public profile, but the figures reported by CSOs are probably a good deal more reliable than budget data, as are those on employees.

A fourth point concerns the organizations classified as “NGOs” for Bangladesh and “NGOs and POs” for the Philippines. In Bangladesh the term “NGO” is generally used for CSOs that operate at the national level with professional staffs, focus on development and depend to some degree on foreign funding, which means they must register with the state NGO Affairs Bureau.¹³ In the Philippines, “NGOs” also work mainly at national level with professional staffs and focus on development but may or may not receive foreign funding. They are contrasted

¹³ This office published the list used by JIGS to identify Bangladeshi NGOs (see BD-JIGS 2009: iv).

(though the division is somewhat fuzzy) with “People’s Organizations” (POs), which tend to be fairly small, managed by volunteers, and operate on a local scale focusing on local issues.¹⁴ The Philippine category in other words comprises many groups that would not be included in the Bangladesh category of “NGOs”. The difference here appears most obviously in looking at organizational membership size in the two countries. In Bangladesh, the top quartile of the 105 NGOs included in the JIGS sample report 2,450 to nine million members, while in the Philippines, the top quartile of NGOs and POs report 346 to one million members.¹⁵

Another way to look at these two CSO populations is to compare them in terms of receiving foreign funds, as shown in Table 7.3. Here we see that 86 or 81 percent of the 106 Bangladesh NGOs report “financial assistance from outside sources,” while only 72 or 27 percent of the 259 Philippine NGOs plus POs do. Obviously some organizations that registered with the Bangladesh NGO Affairs Bureau were not getting foreign support (though perhaps they were hoping to do so, leading them to register), while most likely there were some Philippine groups considered POs that were getting such support (given the fuzziness of the categories), but the distinction between the two countries is clear. Whatever the explanations, though, Bangladeshi NGOs are quite different from their Philippine counterparts in this respect.¹⁶

This difference is an important one for the present chapter, because we should expect that among the CSO types listed in Table 7.2 it would be NGOs that would be the most active advocates in the public policy arena, and comparing NGOs across the two countries would go directly to the heart of the chapter’s goal. If there were some way to sort out the Philippine POs from the NGO+PO category, it would be possible to make direct comparisons, but unfortunately it is not possible to do this with the data in their present form. There are many comparisons that are feasible that will shed light on the advocacy issue, however, and I will pursue them in the remainder of the chapter.

To sum up the discussion of Table 7.2, just over 85 percent of the CSOs included in the two countries (2,141 of the total 2,512) fell into types that could be compared between them. These are the two upper groups in Table 7.2. For the most part, we will be looking only at the larger categories in which each CSO type had 40 or more cases in both countries (the “Top Groups” in Table 7.2); collectively they number 1,731. This population includes just under 73

¹⁴ I am indebted to Gwendolyn Bevis for illuminating the differences between Philippine NGOs and POs. See Blair (2001: 8–9).

¹⁵ The discussion here excludes the 79 Philippine NGO/PO groups apparently miscoded as having 99 members, so that total number of groups is 184 rather than the 263 included in the JIGS survey. See the discussion of Table 7.2 above.

¹⁶ The Yule’s Q statistic noted for Table 7.3 can be interpreted as a proportional explanation varying between zero and one, such that there is a very high connection between the two variables here.

percent of all the Bangladeshi CSOs interviewed and just over 63 percent of the Philippine CSOs.

If we are to explore policy advocacy efforts, we need to look at what policy areas our CSOs are interested in. Table 7.4 lays out the governmental policies of most interest to our “top groups.” Not surprisingly, “social welfare,” “health,” and “education” show the highest concentration of interest among CSOs in both countries.¹⁷ Poverty alleviation was second highest in Bangladesh, and surely would have shown similar strength as an answer in the Philippines if the choice had been offered in the survey.

¹⁷ Health and welfare were combined as categories in the Philippine survey but separated in the Bangladesh version. Had they been separated in the former country, responses would likely have been similar to what appeared in Bangladesh, because many CSOs would have responded positively to both choices.

Table 7.4 Governmental policies of interest to the responding organization

For Top Group CSOs only

Policy area	Bangladesh	Philippines
Financial	14.0%	25.4%
Local/regional development	27.0%	18.4%
Justice & human rights	19.8%	29.0%
Health & welfare	n/a	47.5%
Health only	22.5%	n/a
Social welfare only	63.5%	n/a
Education, recreation	33.9%	44.4%
Poverty alleviation	54.6%	n/a
Culture & religion	25.5%	n/a
Total	260.8%	164.7%

For NGOs and POs only

	Bangladesh—NGOs	Philippines—NGOs and POs
Local/regional development	36.8%	26.4%
Justice & human rights	41.5%	39.1%
Health & welfare	n/a	46.0%
Health only	60.4%	n/a
Welfare only	40.6%	n/a
Education, recreation	50.0%	38.2%

Notes:

1. Only policy areas with at least 20% response from "top group" CSOs in at least one country are shown here.
2. The entry n/a indicates that this choice was not included in the country survey.
3. Respondents were allowed an unlimited number of choices, so the total adds up to more than 100%.

Source of data: BD-JIGS and PH-JIGS

The two most highly political choices were “Justice & human rights” and “Local/regional development.” The lower part of Table 7.4 explores interest in these issues reported by NGOs. Arbitrary and corrupt administration of justice, along with serious abuses of human rights have long festered in both countries, and it makes sense that Bangladeshi NGO groups have been highly involved in the topic, with 41.5 percent of them indicating interest—more than reported from any other type of CSO among the Top Groups. In the Philippines, the comparable figure was 39.1 percent, again higher than what any other Top Group CSO reported.

Political Influence, Advocacy, and Success in Changing Public Policy

Who Has Political Influence?

CSOs wishing to advocate for policy decisions must first make some assessment of the influences those decisions may come under. The JIGS surveys in both countries included a battery of questions asking respondents how much influence they thought various organized sectors had on political decisions. Fortunately, almost all of the sectors identified are similar for both countries. Using a 1-to-7 scale Table 7.5 shows how much influence our Top Group CSOs thought each sector has. For example, on average these CSOs believed trade unions had a slightly more than middling influence in both Bangladesh (4.34) and the Philippines (4.15). For Bangladesh these CSOs thought political parties had the most influence (6.50), a finding that accords with the picture of dysfunctional politics sketched out earlier in this chapter, while in the Philippines parties came in lower at 5.21.

**Table 7.5 Perceived influence of organized sectors on political decisions
Top Group CSOs only on a 1–7 scale**

Sector	Bangladesh	Philippines		
Trade unions	4.34	4.15		
Agriculture org'ns	2.48	3.68	Scale used:	
Business orgns	4.07	4.91	How much influence?	
Nat'l gov't bureaucrats	5.27	4.98	1	very little
Political parties	6.50	5.21	2	little
Party-list parties	X	4.39	3	less
Mass media	5.52	5.65	4	some
Large business org'ns	4.26	5.37	5	more
Scholars, academics	3.49	4.06	6	much
Consumer org'ns	2.45	4.08	7	a lot
Welfare org'ns	3.78	4.10		
Professional org'ns	3.43	X		
NGOs & POs	X	4.52		
Women's movement	3.24	4.33		
Local gov'ts	4.35	5.23		
Foreign gov'ts/ int'l org'ns	5.26	X		
Foreign gov'ts	X	5.99		
Intl org'ns	X	5.46		
Islamic org'ns	4.04	X		
Average for groups	4.17	4.76		

Note: Missing cells (X) indicated this choice was not included in the survey, and they are not included in the average for all groups.

Source of data: BD-JIGS and PH-JIGS

Within the Top Group CSOs, each of the six types in Bangladesh agreed that political parties had the most influence on political decisions, ranging from a high of 6.79 among educational CSOs to 6.20 among the professional organizations. In second place all but the NGOs chose the mass media as having most influence. In the Philippines, four of our six Top Group CSOs picked foreign governments as most influential—presumably referring to the United States—while five of the six chose the mass media as having the second most influence.

Least influential among the organized sectors were thought to be consumer organizations in Bangladesh (2.45 as per Table 7.5) followed by Agriculture (2.48); in the Philippines agriculture came in last at 3.68 and then scholars/academics at 4.06. The fact that political parties ranked highest in Bangladesh adds further evidence of the strong role the BNP and AL have played there in recent years, while the relatively feeble and ephemeral Philippine parties scored quite a bit lower, corresponding to the widespread perception of their comparative weakness. Still, the difference at 1¼ points does not appear as great as the common picture of overgrown, avaricious Bangladesh parties and feeble, opportunistic Philippine parties would suggest. In the JIGS survey, parties in both countries seem to swing significant weight. The JIGS survey has devoted considerable attention to the role of political parties, and the chapter's next section will explore the relationship between them and our Top Group CSOs.

CSOs and Lobbying Political Parties

The actual questions employed to assess CSO contact with political parties differed a bit between our two country samples, as noted below:

- Bangladesh: “What kind of relationship and contact do you have with political parties?” (This was the question for Dhaka respondents; the Rajshahi query asked about “relationship and communication” with the parties).
- Philippines: “When your [CSO] organization appeals to or lobbies the political parties listed below, which party does your organization appeal to/lobby and how often does your organization appeal to/lobby this party?”

In each survey, respondents were asked about actions “now” or “today” as well as about those of a decade ago. And in asking how often CSOs approached parties both surveys offered a five-point scale ranging from “never” to “always”. The questions were slightly different, as well as the choices offered for answering, but it should be fair to say that in both countries the focus was clearly on lobbying political parties to support whatever agendas CSOs might have had in mind. So I will consider the questions and answers as essentially the same for both surveys.

In both countries, respondents were asked to respond to similar queries about a series of political parties which actively contested the most recent elections. In Bangladesh these were the BNP and AL as well as the two more prominent among the minor parties (the Jatiyo Party and the Jamaat-e-Islami) and the Bangladesh Communist Party. In the Philippines, they were the two major coalitions of the day, the K4 and the KNP, and also five smaller parties.¹⁸

¹⁸ Living up to their respective permanent and ephemeral reputations, all the Bangladesh parties that contested in 2001 again entered the lists in the following 2008 election, while neither of the two major Philippine coalitions from the 2004 election was still on the scene for the 2010 election.

Table 7.6 portrays contacting and lobbying activity with the two major parties/coalitions on the part of our Top Group CSOs, using the 1-to-5-point scale. A statistical T-test is employed to assess differences in the effort devoted to the top two parties/coalitions at the time of the survey. The first thing to note is that almost all CSO groups in both countries lobbied the ruling party/coalition rather more than the leading parties/coalitions in opposition, a finding that is scarcely surprising.¹⁹ These differences were not always statistically significant, however. CSOs focusing on education, professions, and religions in both countries and business CSOs in the Philippines devoted about the same attention to ruling and opposition parties/coalitions, and accordingly their T scores are insignificant at the .05 level. On the other hand, CSOs in social welfare and NGOs in both countries—perhaps reflecting more sophistication or opportunism—showed a very clear preference for the ruling groups with statistical significance at the .05 level or higher.²⁰

¹⁹ The behavior of Philippine professional CSOs in lobbying the opposition more than the ruling coalition might seem peculiar, but the T score is statistically insignificant at 0.323.

²⁰ The T-test statistics for all six Top Group CSOs in both countries as well as for the entire CSO population (at the bottom of Table 7.6) show significance at the <.001 level, but that is because T is dependent on the total number in the sample, meaning that the larger the sample the lower the threshold of significance. The test is really useful only for relatively small samples.

Table 7.6 Contacting and lobbying political parties

Top Group CSOs only, using a 1–5 scale

Type of organization	Bangladesh					Philippines				
	n	BNP	AL	T test	Signif.	n	K4	KNP	T test	Signif.
Business/economic	253	1.51	1.36	3.74	0.000	40	1.25	1.10	0.97	0.337
Education	50	1.60	1.52	0.65	0.522	52	1.13	1.13	0.00	none
Social welfare	477	1.78	1.59	3.98	0.000	73	1.33	1.12	1.99	0.050
Professional	40	2.00	1.75	1.96	0.058	43	1.09	1.14	-1.00	0.323
NGO (+ PO for Phil.)	99	1.52	1.39	2.03	0.045	259	1.37	1.11	4.51	0.000
Religious-Islamic	138	1.17	1.14	0.89	0.373					
Religious-nonIslamic						148	1.12	1.07	1.19	0.238
Total for six top groups	1,057	1.61	1.46	5.87	0.000	615	1.38	1.17	5.32	0.000
Total for all CSOs in country sample	1,451	1.73	1.54	7.36	0.000	996	1.31	1.14	6.93	0.000

Note: Significance figure is two-tailed.

Source of data: BD-JIGS and PH-JIGS

In what follows, I will focus only on the ruling parties (BNP and K4), though a future exploration might find it useful to look at the opposition parties as well.

Lobbying, Influence, and Policy Success


It is now time to see what can be put together from our two datasets about how advocacy links up with success in getting policy decisions implemented by the state. Both surveys asked three sets of essentially identical questions that hopefully can give us some answers here:

- Contact with political parties: “When your organization contacts or appeals to or lobbies political parties, which party does your organization deal with, and how often does your organization do this?” (This is the same question discussed in the previous section)
- Claimed influence: “When a policy-related problem or incident occurs in the geographical area [that your organization operates in, whether it be local, regional or national], how much influence does your organization have on solving these problems?”
- Lobbying success: “Has your organization ever succeeded in having a policy it favored being implemented by a national or local government in the past several years?”

In causal terms, we might posit a linkage like this:

Interest in advocacy → Contact with parties → Claimed influence → Advocacy success

Or perhaps this:



The first step would be an interest in advocacy, which all CSOs do not necessarily have; many, after all, focus exclusively on service delivery. But neither JIGS survey attempted to gauge “interest in advocacy,” so we will have to assume it exists if a CSO engages in the practice of advocacy. One manifestation of such an interest would be to contact/appeal to/lobby political party leaders. A CSO which does so would be likely to claim that it had some influence over the political scene. And CSOs with such influence would in turn be more likely to report success at getting a policy implemented. Or, as the second model would have it, CSOs wishing to lobby will simultaneously contact parties and claim influence as part of their advocacy maneuvering.

Let us now try to establish some linkages between these factors and see how they relate to our six Top Group CSO types. To aid understanding here, it might be best to begin with the end point of lobbying success and see how well our six CSO types were faring in each country at the time of the surveys, as presented in Table 7.7. The most immediate finding here is that self-reported policy success stands about the same in both countries. The right-hand column shows 14.8 percent of the Bangladeshi CSOs having had at least one success in getting a policy implemented, while Philippine CSOs come out at 16.2 percent—scarcely the degree of difference in advocacy efficacy that I posited at the beginning of this chapter. Even so, there are some differences among the types. Business CSOs appear to do twice as well in the Philippines (30.8 percent success rate) as in Bangladesh (14.8 percent), although their numbers are more than six times as many in Bangladesh (257) as in the Philippines (39). Welfare CSOs follow the same pattern, with more groups but a lower success rate in Bangladesh but fewer groups and higher success in the Philippines. For NGOs the picture is quite reversed both in terms of success and numbers; the Bangladesh success rate is 39.8 percent for 103 NGOs, while in the Philippines success came only to 18.9 percent among a much larger group of 259 organizations.²¹ Professional CSOs emerge about the same in both at around 20 percent, and our other two types—education and religion—don’t do very well in either country.

²¹ As before, the unexpected Philippine showing may be due in part to the inclusion of POs, which are less likely to pursue policy advocacy agendas.

Table 7.7 Top Group CSO types and success in having a policy implemented by a national or local government

BANGLADESH Top Group CSOs only

		Organization Classification						Total
		Business	Education	Social welfare	Profes-sional	NGO	Islamic religi-ous	
Succeeded in having a policy being implemented	Yes	38 14.8%	7 13.2%	59 12.1%	9 20.5%	41 39.8%	6 4.3%	160 14.8%
	No	219 85.2%	46 86.8%	427 87.9%	35 79.5%	62 60.2%	135 95.7%	924 85.2%
	Total	257 100.0%	53 100.0%	486 100.0%	44 100.0%	103 100.0%	141 100.0%	1084 1.0

PHILIPPINES Top Group CSOs only

		Organization Classification						Total
		Business	Education	Welfare	Profes-sional	NGOs & POs	Religi-ous	
Implemented a favored policy	Yes	12 30.8%	2 3.8%	16 21.9%	8 19.0%	49 18.9%	12 8.2%	99 16.2%
	No	27 69.2%	51 96.2%	57 78.1%	34 81.0%	210 81.1%	135 91.8%	514 83.8%
	Total	39 100.0%	53 100.0%	73 100.0%	42 100.0%	259 100.0%	147 100.0%	613 100.0%

Source of data: BD-JIGS and PH-JIGS

To pursue the linkages suggested above in more detail, some kind of regression analysis would be useful. Given that the dependent variable here (advocacy success in the models above) is a binary with only a yes-or-no answer, the more straightforward and more easily interpreted ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions would not be appropriate, so I will employ a logistic

(also known as logit) regression, which shows how various predictors or independent variables—which represent different CSO advocacy activities—would suggest the dependent variable falls on the “yes” or “no” answer.²² A good example can be developed by looking at CSOs in both countries that operate primarily at the national level, as opposed to the neighborhood, township, county or international level. As shown in Tables 7.8A and 7.8B, these groups amounted to 190 in Bangladesh and 119 in the Philippines. For Bangladesh 28.9 percent of these national-level CSOs reported success at policy change, while in the Philippines, it was a bit less at 26.1 percent. These distributions should facilitate a logistic regression approach.

Table 7.8A Bangladesh CSOs operating at macro-level and self-reported success in policy change

	Succeeded in changing policy		Total
	No	Yes	
Ward	699	69	768
	91.0%	9.0%	100.0%
Thana	270	30	300
	90.0%	10.0%	100.0%
District	147	35	182
	80.8%	19.2%	100.0%
Nation	135	55	190
	71.1%	28.9%	100.0%
International	21	20	41
	51.2%	48.8%	100.0%
Total	156	75	231
	67.5%	32.5%	100.0%

Source of data: BF-JIGS

Table 7.8B Philippine CSOs operating at macro-level and self-reported success in policy change

²² SPSS version 19 was used for the regression exercise. For a good explanation of logistic regression, see UCLA Academic Technology Services (n.d. 1 and n.d. 2).

	Succeeded in changing policy		Total
	No	Yes	
Barangay, town, city	617	122	739
	83.5%	16.5%	100.0%
Province	44	8	52
	84.6%	15.4%	100.0%
Region	34	8	42
	81.0%	19.0%	100.0%
Nation	88	31	119
	73.9%	26.1%	100.0%
International level	24	6	30
	80.0%	20.0%	100.0%
Total	112	37	149
	75.2%	24.8%	100.0%

Source of data: PH-
JIGS

The logistic analyses for our two countries appear in Tables 7.9A and 7.9B. Some 14 variables that seemed to show some hope as predictors were common to both data sets, so I included all of them in this exploratory logistical exercise. Missing data meant that such a procedure reduced the number of cases from 190 to 149 for Bangladesh and from 119 to 110 for the Philippines. The goal of the regression exercise is to determine to what extent these independent variables can help predict the yes-or-no outcomes concerning policy change.

Table 7.9A Bangladesh logistic regression analysis for CSOs operating at national level

Table 7.9A1 Classification Table before the regression^{a,b}

			Predicted			
			Succeeded in changing policy			Percentage Correct
			No	Yes	Total	
Observed	Succeeded in changing policy	No	107	0	107	100.0
		Yes	42	0	42	0.0
		Total	149	0	149	
Overall percentage predicted correctly						71.8
a. Constant is included in the model.						
b. The cut value is .500						

Source of data: BD-JIGS

Table 7.9A2 Classification Table after the regression^{a,b}

			Predicted			
			SuccFeeded in changing policy			Percentage Correct
			No	Yes	Total	
Observed	Succeeded in changing policy	No	100	7	107	94.4
		Yes	26	16	42	38.1
		Total	126	23	149	
Overall percentage predicted correctly						77.9
a. Constant is included in the model.						
b. The cut value is .500						

Source of data: BD-JIGS

Table 7.9A3 Model Summary: Pseudo R-squares

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	137.972 ^a	.232	.333
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.			

Source of data: BD-JIGS

Table 7.9A4 Variables in the Equation

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Q110B. CSO's claimed policy influence	-.437	.232	3.534	1	.060	.646
Q2201. Relations with ruling party (BNP)	-.109	.261	.175	1	.675	.896
Q2202. Relations with main opposition (AL)	-.666	.341	3.829	1	.050	.514
Q2401. Contact parties in cabinet	.039	.301	.017	1	.897	1.040
Q2402. Contact opposition parties	.671	.343	3.832	1	.050	1.957
Q2403. Contact govt depts. & agencies	.148	.173	.732	1	.392	1.159
Q2404. Help draft legislation	1.114	.473	5.547	1	.019	3.046
Q2405. Present research/tech info to officials	.453	.282	2.569	1	.109	1.573
Q2406. Send reps to councils, advisory bodies	-.240	.335	.513	1	.474	.787
Q2407. Ask CSO members to contact officials	.014	.327	.002	1	.965	1.014
Q2408. Engage in protests, demonstrations	.002	.234	.000	1	.994	1.002
Q2409. Organize seminars, rallies	.128	.249	.265	1	.607	1.136
Q2410. Hold press conferences	-.017	.257	.005	1	.946	.983
Q2411. Form coalitions with other org'ns	.174	.192	.827	1	.363	1.190
Constant	-2.044	.965	4.487	1	.034	.129

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Q110B, Q2201, Q2202, Q2401, Q2402, Q2403, Q2404, Q2405, Q2406, Q2407, Q2408, Q2409, Q2410, Q2411.

Source of data: BD-JIGS

Table 7.9B Philippines logistic regression analysis for CSOs operating at national level

Table 7.9B1 Classification Table before the regression^{a,b}

			Predicted			
			Succeeded in changing policy			Percentage Correct
			No	Yes	Total	
Observed	Succeeded in changing policy	No	82	0	82	100.0
		Yes	28	0	34	0.0
		Total	110	0	110	
Overall percentage predicted correctly						74.5

a. Constant is included in the model.
b. The cut value is .500

Source of data: PH-JIGS

Table 7.9B2 Classification Table after the regression^{a,b}

			Predicted			
			Succeeded in changing policy			Percentage
			No	Yes	Total	Correct
Observed	Succeeded in changing policy	No	77	5	82	93.9
		Yes	13	15	28	53.6
		Total	110	20	110	
Overall percentage predicted correctly						83.6
a. Constant is included in the model.						
b. The cut value is .500						

Source of data: PH-JIGS

Table 7.9B3 Model Summary: Pseudo R-squares

Step	-2 Log likelihood	Cox & Snell R Square	Nagelkerke R Square
1	87.858 ^a	.285	.420
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than .001.			

Source of data: PH-JIGS

Table 7.9B4 Variables in the Equation

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Q07rev. CSO's claimed policy influence	.562	.273	4.227	1	.040	1.754
Q14a1. Lobby ruling coalition (K4)	.523	.432	1.465	1	.226	1.687
Q14a2. Lobby opposition coalition (KNP)	-.863	.551	2.454	1	.117	.422
Q20_1. Contact parties in cabinet	.468	.491	.909	1	.340	1.597
Q20_2. Contact opposition parties	-.249	.692	.130	1	.719	.779
Q20_3. Contact govt depts. & agencies	-.033	.315	.011	1	.917	.968
Q20_5. Help draft legislation	.846	.508	2.774	1	.096	2.331
Q20_6. Present research/tech info to officials	-.114	.379	.091	1	.763	.892
Q20_7. Send reps to councils, advisory bodies	.310	.347	.798	1	.372	1.363
Q20_8. Ask CSO members to contact officials	-.376	.384	.960	1	.327	.687
Q20_9. Engage in protests, demonstrations	.064	.360	.031	1	.860	1.066
Q20_10. Organize mass meetings	-.105	.359	.086	1	.769	.900
Q20_13. Hold press conferences	.394	.289	1.859	1	.173	1.483
Q20_14. Form coalitions with other org'ns	.191	.259	.543	1	.461	1.210
Constant	-5.091	1.347	14.296	1	.000	.006
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Q07rev, Q14a1, Q14a2, Q20_1, Q20_2, Q20_3, Q20_5, Q20_6, Q20_7, Q20_8, Q20_9, Q20_10, Q20_13, Q20_14.						

Source of data: PH-JIGS

For the Bangladesh example, in the first classification in Table 7.9A1 (“before the regression”), the rows (“observed” cells, reading across the table) reveal that of the 149 cases, 107 failed to change a policy while 42 succeeded. The best prediction at this point, when we know nothing more than that most CSOs failed, would be that any particular group failed. Accordingly, we would guess (reading down the “predicted” columns) that all cases failed, which would give us a correct prediction rate of 71.8 percent (107 of 149).

The logistic regression exercise yields Table 7.9A2 (“after the regression”), which shows how our predictor variables would affect our prediction. Now we would predict 126 failures and 23 successes (the “total” row of the table). In fact, 100 of the 126 predicted failures (the “no” column) were actually failures (the other 26 were in fact successes or “false negatives”), while 16 of the 23 predicted successes were real successes and the other seven were “false positives”). Overall, our percentage of correct predictions increased from 71.8 percent (107 of 149 in Table 7.9A1) to 77.9 percent (100 + 16 = 116 of 149 in Table 7.9A2). To put it the other way around, our bad predictions were reduced from 28.2 percent (100.0 percent minus the 71.8 percent correct predictions in Table 7.9A1 = 28.2 percent) to 22.1 percent (100.0 percent - 77.9 percent) in Table 7.9A2. This 6.1 drop in percentage points (28.2 percent - 22.1 percent = 6.1 percentage points) represents an improvement of more than one-fifth ($6.1/28.2 = 21.6$) in bad predictions.

The analogous Philippine case, presented in Table 7.9B, can be more quickly summarized. The initial prediction would have been 74.5 percent correct (in Table 7.9B1), and the logistic regression improved this to 83.6 percent in Table 7.9B2. Bad predictions accordingly declined from just over one-fourth (100.0 percent - 74.5 percent = 25.5 percent) to just over one-sixth (100.0 percent - 83.6 percent = 16.4 percent). The difference of 9.1 percentage points (25.5 percent - 16.4 percent) shows an improvement of more than one-third ($9.1/25.5 = 35.7$).

In other words, the Philippine CSOs were slightly more successful at policy change to begin with than their counterparts in Bangladesh (74.5 percent in Table 7.9B1 vs 71.8 percent in Table 7.9A1), and inserting our knowledge of CSO activities in both countries enables us to explain more of the difference between success and failure in changing policies (reducing our bad predictions by one-third for the Philippines as against only one-fifth in Bangladesh).

The two “R square” (R^2) statistics in the next “Model Summary” boxes (Tables 7.9A3 and 7.9B3) are often called “pseudo R squares,” as they represent efforts to emulate the familiar “ R^2 ” or “adjusted R^2 ” statistic in OLS regressions, which can be interpreted as percentage of variance in the dependent variable that is explained by the predictor variables. The Cox and Snell and the Nagelkerke R Square comprise two such efforts, and—like others that have been devised—they

give only a very rough approximation of the OLS version²³, but they do show the Philippines logistic regression (Cox and Snell R-square = .285, and Nagelkerke R-square = .420) doing a rather better job at prediction than the Bangladesh equation (R-squares of .232 and .333 respectively).

The final logistic regression tables (7.9A4 and 7.9B4) display the regression coefficients.²⁴ Comparisons within and between the two countries are easy here, because all variables in both use the same scales (binary for the dependent and a 1-to-5 scale for all the predictors). For Bangladesh, the only predictor that shows significance even at the .05 level is helping to draft legislation (B = 1.114 and significance = .019), which makes sense in that a CSO getting involved in drafting a bill is almost surely one influencing policy changes. It is interesting to note, though, that links to the ruling party seem to have no effect, but connections with the main opposition party have a negative effect (B = -.666 and almost statistically significant at .05).²⁵

For the Philippines, claimed policy influence is the only predictor achieving statistical significance at the .05 level, perhaps for reasons similar to those I speculated on with respect to Bangladesh: claiming influence is likely more the result of affecting policy changes than a cause of it.

Altogether then, we find a somewhat greater linkage between macro-level advocacy activities and self-reported success in the Philippines than in Bangladesh, at least for CSOs operating primarily at the national level. Unfortunately, logistic regressions do not permit the kind of “explained variance” facilitated by OLS regression’s R-square statistic, whereby the researcher can say that a certain percentage of the variance in a dependent variable can be accounted for by a set of predictors. The pseudo R-squares shown in Tables 7.9A3 and 7.9B3 offer a rough approximation of this, however, and it can be observed that the Philippine figures are substantially higher than their Bangladesh counterparts.²⁶ Even so, there are no predictors for

²³ For an explanation of pseudo R-square approaches, see UCLA Academic Technology Services (n.d. 3). The Nagelkerke statistic is devised to have a maximum value of 1, like the OLS R^2 , so is more directly (if imperfectly) comparable to it.

²⁴ The “Q” numbers by each variable in Tables 7.9A4 and 7.9B4 refer to the question numbers in the codebooks for Bangladesh and the Philippines (BD-JIGS 2009, PH-JIGS 2007) and are shown here to help future researchers replicate and expand the exploration undertaken in this chapter.

²⁵ It is curious that contact with opposition parties generally has a positive effect (B = +.671), perhaps because some successful CSOs had relationships with minor opposition groups like the Jatiyo Party.

²⁶ If the Pseudo R-square of .420 shown for the Philippines in Table 9B3 were actually an adjusted R-square for an OLS regression, it would be quite impressive. See also n. 25 above.

either country that provide a convincing explanation for advocacy success: Drafting legislation and claimed influence just do not make a very good case.

In the end, it could be that there really is very little relationship between CSO advocacy efforts and advocacy success and that the approaches used here demonstrate that lack of connection. But it could also be that I chose the wrong predictors from the surveys, that the predictors themselves were not actually valid (for example, perhaps many claims of policy influence were empty boasting), that the responses of advocacy success were inflated by CSO respondents, or that some other reason(s) were at work. Probing deeper, it could be the case that there in fact is no real difference between Bangladesh and the Philippines in CSO levels of success in getting a policy implemented, as is implied by the very similar success rates emerging in Table 7. But the strong qualitative evidence cited at the beginning of this chapter would argue in favor of serious differences, and the better research path to take would be to continue looking for some quantitative ways to test this widespread perception rather than assume that one brief statistical foray has disproved it. A more thorough scrutiny of the data collected in the JIGS surveys might identify other variables that would provide a better explanation, or perhaps uncover other levels (for example, municipal) or NGO types (for example, business groups) that exhibit more exact linkages between advocacy and impact on the policy process.

Conclusion

The first task in the present exploratory exercise was to assess the overall comparability of the two country samples. Each included a larger sample of CSOs in the metropolitan area of the capital city plus a smaller set in a major regional hub. The Bangladesh sample was about 50 percent larger than the Philippine one, but both were large enough to permit breaking them down into subgroups for more detailed analysis. A second task lay in establishing that at the time the surveys were taken, there was good reason to think that Philippine CSOs would have had more impact on public policy decisions than those in Bangladesh. This appeared to be the case and provided a tentative hypothesis to test.

Thirdly, it was necessary to ascertain whether the material in the two country datasets has enough similarities to permit good comparisons to be made. This meant finding CSO types that had the same (or virtually the same) operational focus and existed in sufficient numbers to be compared. Table 7.2 shows at least six such types (the “Top Group CSOs” at the top of the table). Some categories did not quite fit, such as the NGOs for Bangladesh vs the “NGOs + POs” for the Philippines, but the match seemed close enough to proceed. Altogether the Top Group CSOs include close to 70 percent of the total sample, which should be a large enough number to work with.

A fourth question asked whether CSOs in the two countries had sufficiently similar policy interests to be compared. Table 7.4 affirms that there are, in particular focusing on issues related

to justice/human rights, and local/regional development, which would be central to CSOs concerned with policy matters. At this point, it was time to address the advocacy linkages that might be ferreted out from the datasets. Thus a fifth query looked at where CSOs thought policy influence might lie, for that would be a prerequisite for deciding where to direct our advocacy efforts. Table 7.5 indicates that in Bangladesh political parties were thought to be most influential in policy decisions, followed by the media and foreign governments and international organizations, while Philippine CSOs considered these foreign bodies to be most influential, followed by the media and big business, both ahead of parties. This finding reflects the domineering role of Bangladesh parties contrasted with their more ephemeral role in the Philippines.

Sixth, though they may be significantly less powerful in the Philippines than in Bangladesh, the abundance of measures concerning parties included in the datasets lead us to test them as the object of CSO efforts at policy advocacy. Not surprisingly, Table 7.6 shows that our Top Group CSOs contact and appeal to the ruling parties more than the leading opposition parties in both countries, especially for welfare CSOs and NGOs. As a seventh major task, I looked at CSO reporting on success in having a policy implemented, which (assuming accurate responses) should be a good if somewhat vague test of organizational efficacy in political advocacy. Somewhat surprisingly in view of the suppositions forming this chapter's principal inquiry, Table 7.7 shows that our Top Group CSOs had just about the same success rate in Bangladesh (14.8 percent) as in the Philippines (16.2 percent). In the eighth and final task, I tried to parse out some of the linkages between lobbying practice, self-perceived policy influence and actual success in advocacy, by employing a logistic regression model. The model did show some connection between these three variables, but in all cases it was far too feeble to account for anything resembling the stark differences between the two countries that I had posited at the outset of the chapter.

Altogether then, the present exercise has not produced clear findings, to say nothing of startling insights. But I hope it has provided some ideas on how comparative analysis might be charted with these rich datasets. Given the conscientious effort by the survey designers to use similar questionnaires across the 14 countries included so far, the potential for comparative inquiry is enormous. I hope that I have illustrated some of the possibilities for such analysis by the inquiry I have undertaken here.

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