

Sheikh Mujib and Deja Vu in East Bengal

The Tragedies of March 25

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Why did Sheikh Mujib and the Awami League not include some plan for the worst? It is the thesis of this paper that they did not because the whole chain of events that took place in March of 1971 repeated almost exactly a similar sequence from March of 1969.

Everything must have looked almost the same to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in early and mid-March of 1971 as it did two years previously. As to the immediate future, imposition of martial law, forced cessation of political activity, and even a few firings on protesting mobs of students and workers had become the standard fare of politics in East Pakistan, after all, and would only set things back for awhile. After the hiatus, there would be time enough for continuing the Awami League drive for autonomy. In any event, the election showed that the League was uncontestedly the will of the Bengali people, a will that would surely in the end prevail. Preparations, then, were not made for what to do in case the army wanted to do more than merely keep order.

But instead of reimposed martial law came cataclysm.

IN the White Paper that the Government of Pakistan published in August 1971,¹ it is asserted that the Awami League of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman plotted in conspiracy with India an uprising that was to take East Bengal out of the Republic of Pakistan. "The operational plan was worked out in meticulous detail: it was arranged that on a signal from the Awami League headquarters in Dacca, the armed uprising would begin... Early hours of Friday morning [March 26] were fixed as the zero hour for the armed uprising." It was only a few hours before this "zero hour", the White Paper continues, that President Yahya Khan ordered the army into action to forestall the plot, put down the insurrection, and thwart the treasonous secessionists.²

Reports from the scene indicate otherwise. There were a number of foreign correspondents present in Dacca at the time to cover the talks going on between the Sheikh and President Yahya over the formation of a government and constituent assembly, and there is a consensus among their despatches that the Awami League could not have made any serious plans for insurrection and secession.³ As the army was fanning out over the city of Dacca

to strike in the early evening of March 25, the Sheikh himself was in the process of issuing directives to get the jute exports moving again after the administrative paralysis of early March. When he learned that the army was shooting up the city and hunting down all Awami League members, he waited calmly at his home to be arrested.⁴ There seem to have been no contingency plans at all in case Yahya decided to crush Bangla Desh by force, and resistance to the West Pakistan troops in those early days of March and April was almost non-existent.

Why did Sheikh Mujib and the Awami League not include some plan for the worst? It is the thesis of this paper that they did not because the whole chain of events that took place in March of 1971 repeated almost exactly a similar sequence from March of 1969.⁵ In both years the regular bureaucracy throughout the province had come to a complete halt in its activities, and there were stories of peasant jacqueries in the countryside. Actually, these stories were highly exaggerated, for a parallel *de facto* government under Awami League-oriented student groups managed to keep order in most of the rural areas while they defied curfews and demonstrated in the cities.

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman addressed huge public throngs, and became the symbol of Bengali resistance to rule from the western wing of the country. Yet in some ways he was more led than leader, for student pressure forced him into taking a more radical stance in his negotiations with Islamabad than he would have preferred. Mujib's strongest political rival in the West, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, accelerated the crisis by boycotting efforts to return the country to popular rule. Against this background, the army steadily increased its troops and firepower in the East through emergency airlift and by ship, and in the end the military intervened.

The denouement came on exactly the same day in both years, March 25. In 1969 it was the imposition of martial law and a temporary cessation of political activity, but soon afterward the Sheikh was able to resume his campaign for provincial autonomy. When the same pattern of events reappeared in 1971, he may well have thought that at worst there would be another period of martial law after which things would be back at the starting point. He was wrong. Instead of martial law came the slaughter of hundreds of thousands, the expulsion

of millions from the country, and the spoliation of the province.

The underlying causes in both sequences were much the same, but the immediately precipitating factors were somewhat different. In November 1968 pent-up resentment at the decade of authoritarian rule of Ayub Khan finally broke loose with a series of student riots in Rawalpindi. Supported by the charismatic Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, students and intellectuals elsewhere in the western wing joined in the dissent, and despite Bhutto's arrest, soon the rebellion had spread all over the province.⁶ In December the unrest appeared in the East, and several general strikes occurred, first in Dacca, and then in the province as a whole.

Mujib was in jail at the time as part of the "Agartala Conspiracy Case" that the Ayub government was pressing, charging that Rahman and others had plotted with Indian government officials to detach the eastern wing of Pakistan. Leadership in the anti-Ayub agitation fell to his leftist rival Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, who organised and publicised the general strikes.⁷

As 1969 began, opposition leaders from both wings of the country formed a centre-right Democratic Action Committee to conduct more co-ordinated agitation against Ayub, and student groups in East Pakistan converged to establish a Student Action Committee to do the same at the student level. Politicians, students and labour unions all participated in the growing crescendo of general strikes and demonstrations that paralysed the province. Events in the western wing proceeded at more or less the same pace, and after initial reluctance, Ayub announced on February 1 that he was willing to meet with opposition political leaders at a Round Table conference to discuss the current crisis and possible solutions. Bhutto was released from prison on February 11, and Ayub proposed to allow the Sheikh to attend on parole from prison (meanwhile continuing the Agartala Conspiracy Case against him!). Bhutto declined to participate and, after some hesitation, Sheikh Mujib refused the offer also, demanding that the charges against him be dismissed altogether. Agitation continued to escalate in the East, and on the night of February 18, thousands of people ignored the army curfew in Dacca and roamed the city, the first such large-scale defiance in Pakistan.⁸

On February 21, Ayub announced that he would withdraw from politics after his present term of office, and the

next day he dropped the Agartala case and released Sheikh Mujib. The Sheikh then agreed to attend the Round Table talks (though Bhutto still refused), held on February 25 and again beginning on March 10.

In the second chain of events, Sheikh Mujib was active from the outset. National elections, postponed from their original date in October because of serious flooding in East Pakistan, were held in December, with those elected to be under a mandate to draw up a new constitution for the country.⁹ December 7, then, which in 1968 saw the first of the general strikes in East Pakistan, was in 1970 the date of the first direct franchise national election ever held in the country. The Sheikh's Awami League won an overwhelming victory, capturing some 72 per cent of the votes and 167 of the 169 seats allotted to East Pakistan in the assembly, over half of the country's total of 313 seats.

The fact that the Awami League had an absolute majority in the assembly upset a number of calculations quite badly. When Yahya agreed to conduct an election in which seats would be allocated on the basis of population, no one thought that the Awami League would win virtually all the seats in the eastern wing. When this did happen, Sheikh Mujib had the chance to form a government strictly confined to his own party, and write his own constitution. Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party, though the largest group from the West with 84 of its 144 seats (including about two-thirds of those assigned to Punjab) could be shut out entirely. On February 15, Bhutto served notice that his party would boycott the National Assembly when it was due to begin meeting on March 3. Yahya, faced with the possibility of a constitution that would leave Punjab's interests out of account, announced 48 hours before the assembly was to meet that the meeting would be postponed.¹¹ The mood of the Bengalis changed immediately from euphoria to outrage. Sheikh Mujib called a general strike, which completely paralysed the province for several days and precipitated a number of firings by the army.

Both the anti-Ayub agitation and the smashing electoral victory of the Awami League sprang from the same root, the increasing discontent and resentment in the East over perceived exploitation by the West, especially the Punjab. During the first 20 years of Pakistan's independence, the bulk of investment and budgetary resources had gone

to the western wing, a disparity that was reflected in differential growth rates.¹² In the summer of 1968, for example, official figures were released showing that while in the West per capita income had grown from Rs 366 in 1959-60 to Rs 463 in 1966-67, it had increased in the East from Rs 278 to only Rs 313 over the same period.¹³ Certainly the fact that much of this western development was financed by the retention of foreign exchange earnings from East Pakistan's jute exports did nothing to lessen feelings of exploitation. And Bengali underrepresentation in the bureaucracy added considerably to these feelings. Despite repeated official proclamations in favour of parity for the two wings in government service recruitment, East Pakistanis amounted to only 36 per cent of the members of the elite Civil Service of Pakistan in 1968, and in other branches of the bureaucracy, similar disparities prevailed, and Westerners, mainly Punjabis, filled most of the positions.¹⁴ Against this background, the Awami League's Six-Point programme for provincial autonomy had great appeal in the East,¹⁵ and it was on the basis of the Six-Points that the Sheikh built his campaigns both times.

In both years, as March began to unfold, the patterns of events became more and more alike. In 1969 the general strike had created an almost complete vacuum of authority in the province. Monem Khan, the Governor, refused even to step outside his headquarters during March, and his authority did not go beyond his office door. Police and civil servants stayed away from their posts, partly in obedience to the strike call, partly out of fear of peasant reprisals against those who had supposedly used their positions under the Ayub regime to exact exorbitant bribes and protection money from the citizenry. Stories of lootings, arson, rape and summary executions by "people's courts" spread quickly.¹⁶

Soon, however, it became apparent that the whole province had not become consumed in an orgy of mob violence. The rampages, in fact, were confined to only four of the more than 70 subdivisions of the province. For the most part, the Student Action Committee, with its 300,000 and more adherents under the direction of Tofail Ahmad, a law student at Dacca University, managed to keep the peace. Except for several well-publicised incidents, student "peace committees" were able to keep peasant discontent in check.¹⁷

In the 1971 sequence, the halt in

bureaucratic activity was even more complete. Immediately after Yahya's postponement of the National Assembly, Sheikh Mujib called for a general strike. He renewed the call several times and then at a mass rally in Dacca on March 7 requested a week-long strike over the whole province. The first evidence of the totality of the response came the very next day, when the Chief Justice of the Dacca High Court (the highest judicial authority in the province) refused to administer the oath of office to Yahya's new Governor for the East, General Tikka Khan.¹⁸ For the remainder of the month, civil servants abandoned their official posts. The province was governed through a series of directives issued from Awami League headquarters. These directives spanned the entire spectrum of public activity from keeping all schools closed to specifying the hours during which banks could communicate with the western wing by teleprinter.¹⁹

There were numerous charges from the West that mobs of Bengalis were rampaging through both city and countryside in a manner reminiscent of the alleged atrocities of 1969. Non-Bengalis and those who resisted the Awami League directives were beaten, robbed and killed in another orgy of violence, according to government reports.²⁰ In fact, there does seem to have been considerable violence and even mayhem perpetrated against non-Bengalis after the catastrophic events of March 25, but before that, the Awami League with its student allies had the province under an almost complete parallel government, which kept the peace reasonably well.²¹

As a crowd drawer, Sheikh Mujib has had few equals anywhere. In the subcontinent, where perfervid political oratory is still a widely practiced and popular pastime, crowds of one hundred thousand are not uncommon. Mujib's audiences have been variously estimated at up to two million.²² Even allowing for the hyperbole that is a part of crowd counting, his popularity has been immense.

His remarkable hold on the public affection did not give him the ability to act as a free agent in either sequence of negotiations with the leaders of the West, however. Just after his release in February 1969, he found that the price of the enormous support he received from the Student Action Committee was the widening of the Awami League's Six Points to include an eleven-point list of student demands. The added points included such items as

nationalisation of banks and big industries, and withdrawal from the CENTO and SEATO security pacts, scarcely matters close to the heart of the middle-class oriented Sheikh.²³ In his negotiations with President Ayub at the Round Table conferences, Mujib appears to have found himself rather boxed in by his followers. Ayub is reported to have offered Mujib the prime ministership if only he would moderate his autonomy demands. But if the Sheikh were to retain his political future, the least he could have settled for was full autonomy for the East according to the Six Points (which included provincial control over taxation and assignment of tax revenues to the central government's military forces) and a directly elected legislature based on population. Ayub refused to concede this much, and the Sheikh had to return empty-handed to Dacca in mid-March.²⁴

Indeed, there is some indication that Mujib's very freedom from jail was a result of his giving in to the will of his following. Several sources report that at first he was willing to attend the Round Table conferences on parole, but his militant followers would have none of it: he would attend as a free man or not at all. Accordingly, the Sheikh refused to come to Rawalpindi unless all the Agartala Conspiracy charges were dropped.²⁵

In 1971 there was a good deal of speculation that the Sheikh's followers would pressure him into declaring independence right away when, on February 28, Yahya postponed the National Assembly meeting. There were certainly indications that something momentous would occur at a rally planned in Dacca for March 7.²⁶ In the event, Mujib steered shy of proclaiming independence. Instead, he demanded that Yahya turn over power immediately to the elected National Assembly, rather than waiting until the assembly wrote a constitution, as specified in Yahya's Legal Framework Order setting up the election and assembly.²⁷ During the next few days the Awami League virtually took over the administration of East Pakistan, and on March 15, President Yahya flew to Dacca to confer with Mujib on the possibility of opening the National Assembly on March 25.

The available accounts of the conferences are confusing. From the beginning on March 16 down to the end on the 25th, contradictory reports of progress, virtual agreement and deadlock emerged from Dacca.²⁸ It appears that

Bhutto refused to countenance any scheme whereby the Awami League would form a government, whether constituent assembly or parliament, without him and his Pakistan People's Party. Mujib in turn, standing on customary parliamentary procedure, would not accept the prime ministership of a coalition government, but claimed his right to organise the assembly by himself, since he had an absolute majority of seats.²⁹ Probably as a compromise, the Sheikh then broached a proposal described later by Yahya as a scheme

whereby Martial Law would be withdrawn, Provincial Governments set up and the National Assembly would, *ab initio*, sit in two committees — one composed of members from East Pakistan and the other composed of members from West Pakistan.³⁰

When both the provincial committees had finished their constitution drafting, they would meet as a National Assembly to frame the constitution for the country as a whole.³¹ The two men seem to have tentatively agreed to this plan, but Bhutto, who arrived in Dacca on March 21, objected strongly, insisting that the proposal be changed so as to provide that

no law or constitution could be presented in the National Assembly unless approved by a majority of the members of each wing.³²

In this way Bhutto would hang on to a veto power for himself, the Punjab and presumably the rupee-hungry army budget, which regularly consumed well over half of federal expenditures, and which would probably be cut severely by a Bengali-dominated parliament.³³

The Sheikh was unwilling to back down, and at this point, with a substantial portion of his supporters clamouring for an immediate declaration of independence, he probably could not have given in. Thousands of workers and students were demonstrating daily in Dacca and elsewhere, and the annual "Pakistan Day" celebrations scheduled for March 23 almost turned into a Bangla Desh independence day. Bangla Desh flags went up all over Dacca (including Mujib's house), and demonstrators tore up the national flag.³⁴ It would have been difficult indeed to give the West a veto power over Bengali hopes for autonomy at this stage.

Throughout both months of March, there was a steady influx of troops by air and sea to beef up the small contingent of soldiers on regular duty in the East. At the onset of the 1969

crisis, only the 14th Division of the army was stationed in the East, but as the month wore on, C-130 transport planes from the Pakistan Air Force were used to ferry in additional troops, and there were reports of soldiers travelling in civilian clothes being flown across India on commercial flights of Pakistan International Airlines.³⁵ In addition, several shiploads of troops and equipment sailed the long route around India to reinforce units in the eastern wing.³⁶

In 1971 it was again the 14th Division that was on hand in the East when the crisis began to build up.³⁷ This time it was a good deal more difficult to fly in reinforcements from the West, though. On January 20, several hijackers had forced a plane of the Indian Airlines Corporation to fly to Lahore in West Pakistan, and had demolished the plane after it had landed. In retaliation, the Indian government banned Pakistani overflights, a prohibition still in effect in March.³⁸ Thus Pakistan had to fly its troops all the way around Cape Comorin to the eastern wing. Still, available planes and ships were pressed into service, and thousands of soldiers were flown in, again in many cases dressed as civilians for the flight.³⁹

In sum, everything must have looked almost the same to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in early and mid-March of 1971 as it did two years previously. As to the immediate future, imposition of martial law,⁴⁰ forced cessation of political activity, and even a few firings on protesting mobs of students and workers had become the standard fare of politics in East Pakistan, after all, and would only set things back for awhile. After the hiatus, there would be time enough for continuing the Awami League drive for autonomy. In any event, the election showed that the League was uncontestedly the will of the Bengali people, a will that would surely in the end prevail. Preparations, then, were not made for what to do in case the army wanted to do more than merely keep order.

Instead of reimposed martial law, came cataclysm. Karl Marx observed that

Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce.⁴¹

Marx may have been wrong as well. Perhaps he should have said, "the first time as tragedy, the second as catastrophe".

NOTES

- 1 Government of Pakistan, *White Paper on the Crisis in East Pakistan*, referred to hereafter as the *White Paper* (Islamabad: Ministry of Information and National Affairs, August 5, 1971). An earlier and shorter version was circulated by the Government of Pakistan as "The Present Crisis in East Pakistan: A Statement by an Official Spokesman" (Karachi: Department of Films and Publications, May 5, 1971).
- 2 *White Paper*, p 40.
- 3 Some of the more detailed eyewitness reports were filed by Martin Adeney, "Why Mujib Failed", *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, April 3, 1971; Henry S Bradsher, "East Pakistan in Agony After the Storm", (Washington); *Evening Star*, March 29, 1971; Simon Dring, "Dacca Eyewitness: Bloodbath, Inferno", *Daily Telegraph* (London), republished in *Washington Post*, March 30, 1971; Peggy Durdin, "The Political Tidal Wave That Struck East Pakistan", *New York Times Magazine*, May 2, 1971; and Selig S Harrison, "Eyewitness: Bloody Blitz of Dacca", *Washington Post*, March 28, 1971. See also Peter Hazelhurst, "Secret Catalogue of Guilt and Disaster Over East Pakistan", *Times* (London), June 4, 1971; and Martin Woollacott, "Pakistan in Perspective", *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, July 17, 1971. It will be a long time, if ever, before versions of the March 1971 events are available from any of the participants other than Yahya Khan, and in the meantime we are dependent on newspaper accounts.
- 4 Bradsher, *op cit*; also Gerard Viratelle, "Pakistan — The Week of the Bloodbath", *Le Monde* (Weekly English Edition), April 1-7, 1971. The account of the Sheikh's surrender is carried in Dring, *op cit*, and P Durdin *op cit*.
- 5 It is interesting to note that the events of March 1969 that put Yahya Khan into power were in many ways similar to those that resulted in Ayub Khan's assumption of power in 1958. See Robert LaPorte, Jr, "Succession in Pakistan: Continuity and Change in a Garrison State", *Asian Survey* IX, 11 (November 1969), 842-861.
- 6 A thorough, though somewhat biased, account of the student role in the overthrow of Ayub Khan is given by the expatriate student leader Tariq Ali, who returned from Britain to take part in the anti-Ayub agitation. See his "Pakistan: Military Rule of People's Power", (New York: William Morrow, 1970), esp pp 156-216.
- 7 Tariq Ali details his role in *ibid*, pp 174-179.
- 8 There are a number of accounts of the events of February 18. See *inter alia*, *ibid*, pp 207-209; Selig S Harrison, "Ayub's 11th Hour Move Failed", *Washington Post*, March 31, 1969.
- 9 The plan for elections and a new constitution were laid out in President Yahya's "Legal Framework Order 1970", which is reprinted in the *White Paper*, pp 18-35 of the appendix.
- 10 For an account of the 1970 elections, see Craig Baxter, "Pakistan Votes—1970", *Asian Survey* XI, 3 (March 1971), pp 197-218; also Sharif al Mujahid, "Pakistan: First General Elections", *ibid* XI, 2 (February 1971), pp 159-171.
- 11 For an insightful analysis of Bhutto's role in the 1971 events, see Hazelhurst, *op cit*, and his "Pakistan on Brink of Violent Split After Compromise Fails", *Times* (London), March 5, 1971. Also Mohammed Ayoob, "From Martial Law to Bangla Desh", in Pran Chopra, ed, "The Challenge of Bangla Desh: A Special Debate", (New York: Humanities Press, 1971), pp 40-59 at 51-54.
- 12 See *inter alia* Arjun Sengupta, "Planning for Disparity", in Pran Chopra, *op cit*, pp 79-101; Edward S Mason, Robert Dorfman, and Stephen A Marglin, "Conflict in East Pakistan", in *ibid*, pp 151-159; Richard S Wheeler, "The Politics of Pakistan: A Constitutional Quest", (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp 83-86, 184-186, *et passim*; Aijaz Ahmad, "The Bloody Surgery of Pakistan", *Nation*, June 28, 1971.
- 13 Wheeler, *op cit*, p 185. By 1970, this disparity had not changed significantly; see Mason *et al*, *op cit*, p 154.
- 14 Wheeler, *op cit*, pp 129-130. See also Ralph Braibanti, "Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan: A Critique of Sources, Conditions and Issues, with Appended Documents", (Durham: Duke University Press, 1966), pp 44-55.
- 15 An account of the Six Points is given in M Rashiduzzaman, "The Awami League in the Development of Pakistan", *Asian Survey* X, 7 (July 1970), pp 574-584.
- 16 See, for instance, Cyril Dunn, "Peasants Take a Bloody Revenge", *Observer* (London), March 23, 1969; Peter Hazelhurst, "Pakistan Admits Mob Rule Prevails", *Times* (London), March 20, 1969; Ernest Weatherall, "Pakistani Fragmentation" *Christian Science Monitor*, March 19, 1969.
- 17 Joseph Lelyveld, "Violence Ebbing in East Pakistan", *New York Times*, March 25, 1969; Harrison, "Ayub's 11th Hour Move", *op cit*. Also Rehman Sobhan, "What Follows Ayub's Abdication?" *New Statesman*, March 28, 1969, and his "East Pakistan's Revolt Against Ayub: Old Resentments and New Needs", *Round Table*, 235 (July

- 1969), 302-307; Cyril Dunn, "Why Pakistan Must Hold That Bengal Tiger", *Observer* (London), March 9, 1969. There was considerable speculation that the government purposefully exaggerated the reports of violence to justify the declaration of martial law. See Harrison, "E Pakistanis Resent Army Takeover", *Washington Post*, March 30, 1969, and the two pieces by Sobhan noted above.
- 18 Tillman Durdin, "Military Governor's Oath Blocked in East Pakistan", and "Army's Rule Cut in East Pakistan", both in *New York Times*, March 9 and 10, 1971.
- 19 The directives are listed in the *White Paper*, appendix, pp 37-46.
- 20 A day-by-day account is given in *ibid*, pp 29-41; see also "The Present Crisis in East Pakistan", *op cit*, pp 6-7. President Yahya gave voice to the same charges in his broadcasts of March 26 and June 28, 1971, both reprinted in the pamphlet "Federal Intervention in Pakistan: A President Explains". (Washington: Information Service, Embassy of Pakistan, 1971).
- 21 Tillman Durdin, "East Pakistan Widens Self-Rule in Fight on Economic Problems", *New York Times*, March 13, 1971; "Strikes Continue in East Pakistan", Associated Press dispatch in *Washington Post*, March 16, 1971. Also Adeney, *op cit*, and P Durdin, *op cit*. On the later violence against non-Bengalis, see Anthony Mascarenhas, "Why the Refugees Fled", *Sunday Times* (London), June 13, 1971; S R Ghauri, "Bloodbath in Bengal", *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, May 15, 1971; Henry S Bradsher, "In East Pakistan, We Are All Afraid", (Washington) *Evening Star*, July 19, 1971.
- 22 After his release from prison in February 1969, Mujib is reported to have spoken to over one million people at the Dacca race course. Ralph Blumenthal, "Undisputed Leader of the Bengalis", *New York Times*, December 9, 1970; also P Durdin, *op cit*. Even Tariq Ali, who exhibits a marked distaste for Sheikh Mujib, puts the crowd at a half million on that occasion, *op cit*, p 210. A meeting in January 1971 was estimated at two million, while an eyewitness put the crowd at the Sheikh's March 7 speech at a half million. See "East Pakistani Leader to Seek Autonomy", *New York Times*, January 4, 1971, and P Durdin, *op cit*.
- 23 On adding the eleven points, see Nicholas Tomalin, "Students Run Show in Dying East Pakistan", *Sunday Times* (London), republished in *Washington Post*, March 18, 1969; Wheeler, *op cit*, pp 272-273; and Tariq Ali, *op cit*, p 206. Wheeler and Ali both list the eleven points. On the middle-classness of the Awami League, see in addition to Ali, *passim*, Aijaz Ahmad, "The Bloody Surgery of Pakistan", *Nation*, June 28, 1971.
- 24 "Turbulent Days in Pakistan", *New York Times*, April 3, 1969; Tomalin, *op cit*, Patrick Keatley, "Martial Law in Pakistan as Ayub Goes", *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, March 27, 1969. On the prime ministership offer, see the *New York Times* article just cited and Harrison, "Ayub's 11th Hour Move", *op cit*.
- 25 Harrison, "Ayub's Foes Stiffen Terms for Talks", *Washington Post*, February 20, 1969; Lelyveld, "Four Foes of Ayub to Boycott Talks", *New York Times*, February 19, 1969; also Tariq Ali *op cit*, p 206.
- 26 Cyril Dunn, "Pakistan: Yahya Will Use Army", *Observer* (London), March 7, 1971; Ronald Koven, "Breakup of Pakistan Believed Impending", *Washington Post*, March 6, 1971; "East Pakistan May Declare Secession", *New York Times*, March 7, 1971.
- 27 "New Demands Set By East Pakistanis", Reuters dispatch in *New York Times*, March 8, 1971. Yahya's scenario set out in the Legal Framework Order called for the elected representatives to serve only as a constituent assembly until a constitution was prepared and approved by Yahya himself. Only then would the assembly function as a parliament. See the *White Paper*, appendix, pp 25-27.
- 28 Sometimes at the same time. See "Pakistani Agreement Reported", Associated Press dispatch, and Harrison, "Pakistan Talks Hit Deadlock", both in *Washington Post*, March 25, 1971.
- 29 Hazelhurst, "Secret Catalogue", *op cit*. Yahya claimed later that he had offered Sheikh Mujib the prime ministership "on a platter", but that it was refused. See "Federal Intervention in Pakistan", *op cit*, p 14; also Malcolm W Browne, "Yahya Again Says Aim Is Civil Rule", *New York Times*, May 25, 1971.
- 30 In his broadcast of March 26, 1971. See "Federal Intervention in Pakistan", *op cit*, p 5. A similar, though somewhat confusing account is given in the *White Paper*, pp 19-20.
- 31 *White Paper*, p 20. The "Awami League Draft Proclamation" describing the whole plan in detail is presented in *ibid*, appendix, pp 47-59.
- 32 *Ibid*, p 21 (emphasis added). See also Yahya's speech of March 26, in "Federal Intervention in Pakistan," *op cit*, p 5.
- 33 Military expenditures, which had run over 60 per cent of total government expenditures during the mid-1960s, actually declined to the 53-55 per cent range during the period 1967-1970. See LaPorte, *op cit*, p 854, and Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Adviser's Wing, *Pakistan Economic Survey 1969-70* (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1970), appendix, pp 44-45. The year 1970-71 saw a projected increase of about 12 per cent from the 1969-70 level, and estimates for the 1971-72 year are for spending increasing defence expenditures by another 14 per cent. See *Military Balance 1970-71* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970), pp 67, 111; and *New York Times*, June 28, 1971. The *Times* story gave the 1971-72 datum as being 38.7 per cent of the total government budget, whereas the figures used for earlier years are for what the Government of Pakistan refers to as "total expenditures met from revenues" (cf *Pakistan Economic Survey*), a term which apparently excludes self-supporting agencies like the railways, or posts and telegraphs. The military has been, of course, heavily Punjabi in composition, with the Bengalis having formed perhaps 10 per cent of the officer corps before March 1971.
- 34 P Durdin, *op cit*; "Pakistan Agreement Reported", *op cit*; also Hazelhurst, "Left Challenges E Pakistan Leader on Independence", *Times* (London), March 24, 1971.
- 35 John Hughes, "Pakistan Turnover" and "New Regime Bars Pakistani Split", both in *Christian Science Monitor*, March 27 and April 3, 1969. Also Lelyveld, "Ayub's Hopes Dissolve into Martial Law", *New York Times*, March 30, 1969.
- 36 Ernest Weatherall, "Pakistani Fragmentation?", *Christian Science Monitor*, March 19, 1969. Selig Harrison reported that a whole armoured division was transported in "Ayub's 11th Hour Move", *op cit*.
- 37 Mascarenhas, *op cit*.
- 38 As might be expected, the Pakistan government later charged that the hijacking was part of a plot between the Awami League and the Indian Government. See *White Paper*, p 45.
- 39 Sydney H Schanberg, "East Pakistani Spurns Plan for Inquiry", and "All Part of a Game — A Grim and Deadly One", both in *New York Times*, March 19 and April 4, 1971; Bradsher, "E Pakistan in Agony", *op cit*; and Adeney, *op cit*.
- 40 Actually, the country in March 1971 was legally still under the martial law imposed by Yahya Khan in March of 1969. After the promulgation of Yahya's Legal Framework Order at the end of March 1970, though, the practical effects of martial law had ceased to exist.
- 41 Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte", in Marx and Engels, "Selected Works in Two Volumes", (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955), Volume I, p 247.